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Abstract 
This work revolves around support policies of developing countries which, in most cases, 
need financing and more particularly development aid. In this setting, the aim of this study is 
to evaluate the effectiveness of development aid for a sample of African countries of which 25 
are considered to have intermediate incomes and 23 achieve low incomes. To do this, we 
relied on a cross-sectional regression over the period 1996-2014. Our results imply that good 
governance is a deterministic condition of the positive effect of aid on economic growth. 
Indeed, international aid unaccompanied by good governance practices (control of corruption, 
political stability, a sound regulatory quality, a rigid state of rights, government effectiveness, 
voice and accountability) has adverse effects on economic activity and creates more 
inequalities of opportunity, especially in low-income countries. Thus, we note that the better 
quality of institutions allow a better allocation of international aid towards productive projects 
which stimulates economic growth in the two sub regions. So, in order to achieve the desired 
goals of international aid, countries must first ensure political stability and develop a 
regulatory and institutional framework to organize economic activities, second need to protect 
individual properties and resolve disputes between players in different markets. 
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The last decades have been marked by great difficulties by African developing or 
underdeveloped countries in terms of economic growth and political and social stability. They 
have not even been able to catch up with the emerging countries; contrary to the expectations 
of convergence theories in that these countries are supposed to know speeds of convergence 
that are too high because they are far from stationary states. This reality has prompted many 
academics and international institutions to seek explanations for the non-takeoff of some 
countries rich in raw materials especially which are characterized by absolute and 
comparative advantages at regional and international level. Likewise, the main trading 
partners of these countries have tried to support them in a continuous way directly by 
financial flows or indirectly by dismantling or reducing customs restrictions. Despite the 
importance of international aid in terms of frequency and value, most of the countries 
concerned are still classified as poor or with a low standard of living, which makes the 
question of the effectiveness of these support policies a topic that is still relevant and of major 
importance for both economists and politicians. 
In this context, the previous literature has never ceased to deal with this subject in order to 
find answers to the main occupations and questions related to the effectiveness of 
international aid and the objective of economic development. Although the previous literature 
is abundant, the results are in most cases unconvincing and depend on the methodology 
adopted or the sample used. In other words, the conclusions are ambiguous and mixed. Some 
economists argue for a positive and significant relationship between international aid and 
economic growth (Stiglitz, 2002). The latter argue that development aid is strongly correlated 
with economic growth and reduces the poverty of the countries concerned in a remarkable 
way. They suggest that financial flows in the form of development aid can be seen as 
substitutes for the lack of national savings that subsequently increase the stock of capital, 
which encourages investment by reducing rates and costs of loans. Thus, they show that the 
aid helps improve the living conditions and health of workers in the receiving countries, 
which is transmitted positively on the productivity and performance of employees in addition 
to promoting the exchange of knowledge and technology between rich and poor countries. 
On the other hand, other studies have focused on a non-coherent effect (Mosley, 1980; 
Dowling, 1982; Singh 1985) and sometimes negative effect (Bauer, 1984) of international aid 
on economic growth. In other words, international aid can lead to controversial results by 
negatively affecting the investment rate and development of  
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Third World economies’. This recessive effect of aid is explained, in large part, by the lack of 
responsibilities of public officials seeking their personal interests in an environment of heavy 
corruption and bureaucracy. Thus, international aid removes the reasons for investment or 
productivity improvement projects and can also lead to the appreciation of the national 
currency. The rise in the value of the domestic currency may reduce the profitability of 
tradable goods that become less competitive in the international market, negatively affecting 
the prices of agricultural goods that are the main source of revenue for agents in this type of 
country. Thus, financial flows in the form of development aid do not automatically stimulate 
economic growth and may even lead to contradictory results. They reduce private savings at 
the individual level and delay basic reforms at the global level by safeguarding a low level of 
openness and transparency by policymakers to continue to serve their interests and rents in 
lobbying systems. 
Similarly, another stream of thought has emerged to emphasize a positive and significant 
effect of development aid on the welfare of poor countries conditioned by the quality of 
institutions. More specifically, many studies have conditioned the effectiveness of 
international aid by the presence of civil liberty in the countries of destination (Ishame et al., 
1997). In the same line of research Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) have shown that the 
effectiveness of aid depends on the quality of the economic policies implemented by the 
recipient countries. They support that rampant inflation, unsustainable budget deficit or a 
situation of trade closure increases the risk of foreign support policies failing and requires 
internal reform. Other studies have examined the role of the political and social environment 
in explaining the success of development aid by partners or development agencies in poor 
countries. They suggest, other than economic strategies, the ability to cope with external 
shocks, sociopolitical and post-conflict instability situations, volatility and the risk of 
uncertainty as well as absorptive capacity as deterministic factors of the effectiveness of any 
development aid policy (Amprou and Chauvet, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). In addition, 
other circumstances may have an impact on the relevance and performance of international 
aid projects namely shocks affecting export prices (Collier and Dehn, 2001), climate 
disruptions such as drought and terms of trade (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001). 
So, as part of this last lineage of idea we seek to support a conditional positive relationship 
between international aid and economic growth. In particular, we focus on the contribution of 
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good governance to the effectiveness of development assistance in low- and middle-income 
African countries4. 
Our contribution consists firstly in constructing a synthetic index that encompasses the 
various governance indicators weighted by their contribution to explaining global inertia 
through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).Second, our interest is in individualizing the 
effect of governance, measured based on the indices of World Bank developed by Kaufmann 
et al. (2010), on economic growth that have not been the subject of previous studies. Indeed, 
this iterative approach allows us to assess the responsibility or the contribution of each 
indicator in explaining success or failure of international aid policies and to propose economic 
implications. In other words, we see that every dimension of governance namely corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability, quality of regulation, rule of law and voice and 
responsibility contribute differently to improving the effectiveness of development assistance. 
Our study differs from previous work in the sense that we conduct cross-sectional regressions 
for the cases of countries belonging to the same region, unlike the majority of studies that take 
the form of time series or panel data, or cross section (different regions). Thus, in order to 
keep our sample homogeneous as maximum as possible we subdivide it into two parts 
according to the classification of the world bank of countries by the level of income holding 
similar characteristics for each group. We conclude that the improvement of governance 
quality is a necessary condition and not sufficient for the attractiveness and effectiveness of 
development aid. 
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: first we discuss previous economic 
growth literature highlighting importance of governance quality in improving international 
assistance of poor countries in section (2). Then, we detail our econometric approach and 
present main results and interpretations in section (3) and 4, respectively. Finally, we 
conclude our study with the presentation of key findings and implications in section (5). 
 
                                                             
4 It should be noted that a country is considered to be low-income if the per capita Gross Domestic Product does not exceed 
975 $, while a middle-income country is the one whose individuals have an annual Gross National Income that range 
between 976 and 11905 US dollars (World Bank, 2013). To be precise note that "middle-income countries" include all lower-
middle-income countries with per capita Gross National Product between $ 976 and $ 3865 and higher middle-income 
countries with per capita GNP between $ 3866 and $ 11905. High-income countries are countries with income exceeding $ 
11905. In this paper, we are interested only in the first three categories of countries following the availability of data, whereas 
we rejected those of high income because this category includes only two countries, which number does not guarantee us 
reliable results since our study is based on panel data. 
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2. Literature review 
The question of the aid development effectiveness is still a subject of political and economic 
debate, despite its longstanding treatment. It has been a priority in the discussions at most 
world summits. It is a complex and multidimensional theme as it is of interest to many 
economic and political stakeholders, as well as forming a tool for geopolitical manipulation 
within the reach of major global partners. The problem of inefficiency and visibility of 
significant and clear effects of international aid in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa has 
led many agents to wonder about the undeclared and not declared objectives of such policies 
in this region. Thus, researchers must provide answers to the inconsistency between the 
desired economic and social objectives and the strategies for allocating development aid 
funds. In particular, they focused on explaining and identifying the determinants of the aid-
economic growth relationship instead of poverty reduction. The conclusions are unanimous 
and mixed. 
According to the 2015 Annual Report of the World Bank (Table A.3.2), Sub-Saharan Africa 
occupies the most important part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) (15 milliards 
of dollars), for this reason several empirical studies have examined the effectiveness of aid 
addressed to this region. However, previous studies have neglected to do a disaggregated 
study of the various dimensions of governance by breaking down this region according to the 
income criterion. Thus, to fill this gap, we have decomposed the African region into two sub-
regions: low-income and middle-income countries, with the aim of eliminating the effect of 
heterogeneity that may exist within the sample. Today, African countries are failing to catch 
up with GDP levels in emerging and developed countries. The various partnerships and 
agreements, especially with the European Union, as well as international aid are not stopped, 
with no real impact on development levels. 
For this reasons, the relationship between aid and economic growth has been the subject of 
much scientific researches that can be grouped into three streams. The first line of research 
emphasizes that the aid-growth relationship is positive in the sense that aid for development 
improves economic growth (Stiglitz, 2002). According to this trend aid is positively 
correlated with growth, which can contribute to poverty reduction. Development assistance 
programs improve economic growth by increasing savings and the stock of capital stimulating 
investment. In addition, it increases worker productivity and transmits technology and 
knowledge from rich to poor countries. For example, Sachs (2005a; 2005b) emphasizes the 
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positive role of international aid in advocating for increased subsidies and loans to poor 
countries. He shows that many poor countries are trapped in poverty and argues that aid flows 
from rich countries should increase and that these countries should work closely with aid 
recipients to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, including the eradication of 
poverty.  
In the second line of works, many economists, such as Easterly (2006), show the negative 
effect of Aid. Indeed, the latter highlights the negative aspects of development aid by strongly 
criticizing the aid industry and rejecting the concept of central planning. In the same context, 
several studies have shown that aid flows could have an adverse effect and hurt the economy, 
especially in poor countries. Indeed, Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1972) have shown the 
perverse effects of development aid on economic growth. By focusing on the components of 
development theory in the 1960s, Griffin and Enos (1970) pointed out that foreign capital 
inflows could displace domestic savings by showing the existence of three possible ways in 
which flows could reduce domestic economies. Firstly, public spending or taxation policies 
could be changed by local governments. Secondly, easy access to credit for entrepreneurs 
could undermine their savings motive and, finally, consumption could be increased by aid 
flows. These last two possible causes were also shown by Weisskopf (1972). 
Nevertheless, Hansen and Tarp (2000) found that almost two-thirds of those who support the 
negative effect of savings support suffer from methodological flaws, showing that aid is not 
tied to growth. However, Papanek (1973) and Mosley (1980) found negative effects of the aid 
on domestic savings. Boone (1996) focuses on the relationship between policy and aid 
effectiveness and argues that aid does not contribute to growth. Indeed, aid increases the size 
of government and consumption, and not the consumption of poor people.  
In response to this mixture of results, it is developed a third stream of thought that takes into 
account the institutional and regulatory framework to explain the effectiveness of 
international aid. For example, Burnside and Dollar (2000) discuss conditionality of aid 
effectiveness. They stressed that aid positively affects growth if it is implemented in a good 
political environment, especially with regard to fiscal, monetary and trade policies; however, 
even in this case, the aid has diminishing returns. Thus, they conclude that aid is effective 
when aid flows should be directed to poor countries with good policies.  
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Similarly, Collier and Dollar (2002) argue that aid is not distributed effectively, assuming that 
poverty reduction is the ultimate goal and proposes that aid be allocated after taking into 
account the good policies followed by the poor candidate beneficiary countries. 
Despite the importance of having an idea of whether the effectiveness of aid is linked to the 
political environment, it is essential to study the behavior of governments in aid-receiving 
countries. In other words, it is important to consider how local governments act after 
receiving aid (McGillivray, 1994), as this can be decisive as a policy producers in recipient 
countries may choose to allocate public resources between consumption and investment and 
to finance such activities, between taxes and loans (Gang and Khan, 1991) significantly 
affecting the growth process. In general, aid flows increase government spending, which 
means that subsidy revenues induce public spending, while tax revenues are associated with 
less public spending (Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998). Remmer (2004) finds that aid increases 
government spending and reduces tax revenues, unlike the market-oriented plans that many 
donors are trying to implement for the development of poor countries. The author concluded 
that aid could lead to corruption, since it weakens incentives for politicians to follow good 
policies. In the same context, Knack, (2000) emphasized that high levels of aid can reduce 
institutional quality and administrative capacity and induce rent-seeking behavior in recipient 
countries. Brautigam and Knack (2004) found that in sub-Saharan African countries, higher 
levels of aid are correlated with deteriorating levels of governance. In addition, in developing 
economies, corruption is considered to be the main factor that deteriorates economic 
development. Thus, issues of politics, good governance and corruption are of major 
importance for aid effectiveness. 
In summary, our objective is to identify a potential link between international development 
assistance and economic growth conditioned by governance level quality. So, we present 
firstly a brief review of the literature on the relation between Development Assistance and 
economic growth. Then, we revise the effect of governance in the level of economic growth. 
Finally, we highlight the effect of governance in the effectiveness of official development 
Assistance.   
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2.1. Aid for developments and economic growth 
The relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has attracted much attention in 
recent decades, but the empirical results are mixed. There is now an abundant literature on the 
relationship between aid and growth. For example, Griffin (1970), Griffin and Enos (1970) 
and Weiddkopf (1972) have shown that growth rates are negatively related to the amount of 
foreign capital inflows in the sense that aid can delay development by decreasing domestic 
savings. 
Also, Boone (1996) showed the existence of a negative correlation between economic growth 
and ODA. Indeed, he found the absence of a positive correlation between ODA and economic 
growth, and shows that ODA do not reduce poverty in the sense that it finances only 
consumption rather than investment. Thus, he considers that public development aid is no 
more than a means to increase the size of governments. 
Similarly, Mallik (2008) based on a sample of six poorest and most aid-dependent African 
countries (Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo), showed a 
long-term negative relationship between real GDP per capita and aid as a percentage of GDP, 
investment as a percentage of GDP, and trade openness. In the case of Egypt, Abd El Hamid 
Ali (2013) studied the link between development aid and economic growth during the period 
1970-2010, using the Johansen Cointegration test and the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). He showed a negative and significant impact of foreign aid on economic growth 
both in the short and long-run. 
Young and Sheehan (2014) using a sample of 116 developing countries, between 1970 and 
2010, found that aid flows are negatively correlated with the quality of political and economic 
institutions. These authors also showed that only economic institutions are strongly correlated 
to growth, and through institutions, aid reduces annual growth (by 2%). 
Nevertheless, Papanek (1972) has shown a significant positive correlation between aid and 
economic growth for a sample of 51 countries over the period 1950-1965, particularly as a 
result of the disintegration of capital flows into private capital, foreign aid and other inputs. 
Papanek (1972) criticized revisionist literature by showing the existence of a positive 
correlation between ODA and growth. 
Mitra (2013) used the Johansen Cointegration Test and the Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) to examine the link between development aid and economic growth. He found that 
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development assistance is significantly and positively correlated in the long-run with 
economic growth for the Cambodian case during the period 1971-2009. 
Similarly, Luqman (2013) found that foreign aid is more effective, in the case of Pakistan, for 
the period 1972-2011, applying the ARDL model, and therefore improves the growth process 
in the short and long term only in the presence of development of the local financial sector. 
Recently, new methods based on an Autoregressive Vector Model (VAR) have emerged 
reflecting the new trend of studying the effect of foreign long-term aid on a set of key 
macroeconomic variables that ultimately lead to economic growth. Indeed, Matthijs et al. 
(2013) applied the VAR model and showed that foreign aid is positively and significantly 
correlated in the long-run to income for the 50 developing countries. 
In the same context, Arndt et al. (2015) analyzed the aid-economic growth relationship for the 
case of many developing countries between 1970 and 2000 applying the OLS regressions, 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) and inverse probability weighted least 
squares (IPWLS) estimator. These authors have shown the existence of a positive impact of 
foreign aid on economic growth, including the effect of aid on immediate sources of growth 
(physical and human capital), on well-being indicators (poverty and child mortality) and 
measures of economic transformation (the share of agriculture and industry in value added). 
Arndt et al. (2015) showed that development aid helps stimulate economic growth, promote 
structural change, improve social indicators and reduce poverty. Similarly, Basnet (2015) 
examined the role of foreign aid on savings and economic growth in South Asian countries; 
he found that foreign aid positively affects economic growth, while it crowds out domestic 
savings other than complementing it.  
In addition, Moolio and Kong (2016) confirmed the positive relationship between 
development assistance and economic growth for the following four countries (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) during the period 1997-2014. They found that the aid has a 
favorable effect on economic growth using Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) 
and Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) models.  
More recently, Sothan (2017) studied the relationship between aid and economic growth by 
applying the ARDL model for the case of Cambodia during the period 1980-2014. He found 
that international aid positively affects short-term economic growth in this country. 
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As we have mentioned since the introduction, other work has raised the importance of the 
governance with regard to the study of this subject. So we try to review the previous literature 
relating to the direct effect of the quality of the regulatory and legal framework on economic 
growth. 
2.2. Governance and economic growth 
The relationship between the quality of institutions and growth is the subject of theoretical 
and empirical controversy. This literature has been developed in response to the shortcomings 
associated with classical models to explain the divergence in terms of growth between 
different nations. At the theoretical level, we can cite Solow's model limitations in the 
explanation of growth, and those of Lucas (1988), Romer (1986), Mckinnon and Show 
(1973), Barro (1989), and Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1995) in the analysis of endogenous 
growth. These works are mainly focused on finding determinants of growth but fail to explain 
the difference between nations in terms of capital accumulation and innovation.  
Several authors have attributed this gap in terms of growth to institutional quality. Indeed, 
Barro (1996) gives importance to democracy, Alessina and Perrotti (1994) gives interest to 
the variable of political instability and Rodrik (1999) affirms that good governance is 
important in the improvement of economic results. 
 Also, the new trend of institutional economics considers institutions or governance quality to 
be one of the most important factors of long-term growth. Institutions with well-protected 
property rights, an operational judicial system and a low level of corruption are favorable for 
capital accumulation and growth. However, inefficient institutions favor appearance of a 
market for unproductive activities and increase transaction costs. Thus, institutions improve 
economic growth. Indeed, they affect investment because their role is to protect the property 
rights of investors including foreign direct investment and therefore reduce transaction costs. 
Similarly, North (1981, 1990) and Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) focused on the interaction 
between institutions and growth. This idea was supported by Rodrik (1997, 2003), who 
explains that growth gaps between Asian countries are due to institutional quality.  
The empirical literature places a crucial interest on institutions in promoting economic 
development. Cross-sectional empirical studies have used per capita GDP as a function of 
several institutional variables such as civil liberties, rule of law, property rights, political 
stability and global indicators of governance. For example, Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro 
(1996), Helliwell (1994) and Isham et al., (1997) show the existence of a positive relationship 
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between civil liberty and growth. Kaufmann et al. (2004) suggest that good governance is a 
stimulus for economic growth. Other works have reached the same result as Acemoglu et al. 
(2004). They have explained the difference in growth between rich and poor countries by the 
degree of protection of property rights. Jerzmanowski (2006) finds that the economic 
institution positively affects growth through investor protection. Given the importance of 
governance to explaining economic growth the following section is devoted to the discussion 
of the likely effect of international aid on economic growth conditioned by the level of 
governance. 
2.3. Official Development Assistance, governance and Economic growth 
In the late 1990s, analyzes became increasingly complicated about the link between foreign 
aid and economic growth. Indeed, the analysis of Burnside and Dollar (2000) can be 
considered as the third and last generation of studies of which they have found a significant 
impact of aid on growth, but this relationship is conditional on the quality of the economic 
policy. Indeed, in 1997, with the crisis of legitimacy of ODA and the recovery of aid flows, 
Burnside and Dollar, unlike Boone (1996), brought new conclusions on the effectiveness of 
aid. Indeed, these two authors have included a term of interaction between foreign aid and 
economic policies (aid × economic policy). The purpose of this variable is to differentiate 
between countries with sound economic policies and those with harmful economic policies. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), from a sample of fifty-six developing countries (East Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa), of low or middle income, for six periods of four years between 1970 and 
1993, set out place a composite indicator that includes three economic policy variables: 
inflation, budget surplus, and openness policy. They show that the simple correlation between 
foreign aid and economic growth is almost zero, especially for countries with sound economic 
policies. However, the aid has a significant positive effect on economic growth in good policy 
environments. Contrary to Boone's (1996) finding that there is no opportunity to improve aid 
effectiveness, Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggest a more positive discourse as aid becomes 
more effective in terms of economic growth with better selectivity. 
Similarly, Alesina and Dollar (2000) examined the aid-policy-change relationship, identifying 
different scenarios of significant increases and decreases in aid amounts, for a sample of 60 
countries. In addition, they analyzed developments before, during and after political and 
economic openness, measured respectively by the indicators of democratization and trade 
openness. Alesina and Dollar (2000) pointed out that the largest fluctuations in aid amounts 
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do not precede economic and political reforms. However, Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) 
showed that the recipient country can adopt a better economic policy thanks to ODA. 
Moreover, Amprou (2001) showed that aid is strongly correlated with political reforms in the 
sense that he contribute to promote reforms by making them politically sustainable through 
neutralization of interest groups with ability of resilience. So, ODA can facilitate the reform 
process by partially and temporarily compensating for the harm done to these groups. Also, 
these two authors, out of ten African countries, concluded that aid has played a significant and 
positive role, notably in Ghana and Uganda. However, Devarajan et al. (2001) argued that 
large amounts of aid directed to countries with poor economic policies have tended to prolong 
these bad policies. As a result, the funding allowed the reforms to be postponed. 
However, Berg et al. (2001) showed that the aid could sometimes affect the reforms. For 
example, in Côte d'Ivoire, in 1994, in order to improve competitiveness, various reforms were 
implemented under pressure from donor countries. 
So, the fact that the aid has no effect on economic policy, according to the World Bank, in the 
Assessing Aid report, justifies recourse to the selectivity of the recipient countries. It is true 
that there is unanimous agreement on the failure to practice traditional conditionality, but the 
lack of correlation between aid and the quality of policies is disputed and challenged by 
certain empirical studies, showing that aid may affect policy directions through another 
channel than conditionality. In addition, the aid effectiveness debate began to take into 
account the principle of poverty reduction, especially in the early 1990s. 
In addition to the quality of economic policies, there are other factors that are a necessary 
condition for improving the effectiveness of aid. First, there is vulnerability to external shocks 
that is intimately linked to climate and natural shocks. For example, the case of the food crisis 
justifies the adverse effect of climate change especially on the supply of goods, speaking here 
of an imbalance between supply and demand. These external shocks include climatic factors, 
mainly floods in Asia and southern Africa, drought in Australia and the Sahel of Africa, 
hurricanes in Latin America and the Caribbean, and so on. 
Thus, according to Amprou and Chauvet (2004), the economic growth of vulnerable countries 
risks experiencing shocks through their impact on the quality of economic policies. Also, 
Charnoz and Severino (2005) showed that ODA is more effective in more vulnerable 
countries in that it helps to protect countries from these external shocks. As a result, the 
adverse effect of external shocks on economic growth can be offset by ODA. So, ODA is 
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more effective, especially in countries suffering from external shocks even with poor 
economic policies. 
Secondly, socio-political instability can lead to a deterioration of economic growth, creating 
an uncertain environment that is not very favorable to investment. Indeed, civil wars have 
dramatic human and social effects. Similarly, civil wars lead to a deterioration of national 
production, specifically the destruction of infrastructure and physical capital, as well as the 
diversion of resources to the non-productive sector of military spending. Likewise, this type 
of socio-political instability (wars) leads to a loss of household wealth and their assets. 
According to Hansen and Tarp (2000), the effectiveness of international aid in terms of 
economic growth is closely linked to the existence of limited absorption capacities of the 
recipient countries. Absorbency can be measured by decreasing marginal utility of aid. So, as 
the aid has decreasing marginal returns, then there is a certain threshold beyond which, the 
productivity of an additional dollar Aid decreases. Also, this absorption capacity varies 
according to the different factors such as the solidity of the institutions, the management 
capacity of the administrations, the quality of the public policies, the procedures of the 
donors, the local competences, etc. Indeed, Charnoz and Severino (2005) spoke of a 
theoretical saturation point, showing that if beneficiary countries were to benefit as much as 
possible from aid flows, there would probably be wastage or even misappropriation. 
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1 Econometric method 
In this section we seek to study the relationship between international assistance and 
economic growth using a sample of 48 developing countries of which 23 are considered low-
income and 25 as middle income countries. To do this we are based on the specification of the 
panel data presented us follow which highlights the link between economic growth and the 
amount of foreign aid in addition to a number of variables that are unanimous in previous 
empirical research in the same context:  
𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟏 +𝜷𝟏𝒂𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕+ 𝜷𝟐𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕+𝜷𝟑𝒎𝟐𝒊𝒕+   𝜷𝟒𝒐𝒖𝒗𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟓𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕  +𝝁𝒊𝒕+𝜺𝒊𝒕(1) 
With:  Yit is the log of current GDP per capita in current US dollars, apdit is the log of the 
amount of US current per capita received net aid (McGillivray et al., 2006), M2 is logarithm 
of monetary mass measured by money and quasi money as % of GDP) (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000), Pop refers to population growth (annual%) (Ekanayake and Chatrna, 2010) which is 
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proxying for the labor force, ouv refers to the trade opening that is measured by the sum of 
export and import relative to GDP(%) (McGillivray et al., 2006; Gries et al., 2009), inf refers 
to inflation which is approximated by the GDP deflator (annual %) (McGillivray et al., 
2006);𝛼 is a constant; 𝜺𝒊𝒕 designates the model error term; β represents the parameters to be 
estimated; 𝝁𝒊𝒕 represents the individual effects (i = 1,..., 48) and t denotes the time (t = 1996, 
... ,2014). 
From a methodological point of view, we will try to study the effectiveness of development 
aid in terms of growth by insisting on the important role of the quality of governance. The 
estimation of our model begins with a study of the effect of development aid on economic 
growth using the fixed-effect model (FE) or the random-effects model (RE). The choice 
between these two models is made using the Hausmann test (1978). Then, we ensure the 
robustness of our results through the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) method. In this case 
panel model specification is as follow: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕  = 𝜶𝟏  + 𝜷𝟏𝒂𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑮𝑶𝑽𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝒎𝟐𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝒐𝒖𝒗𝒊𝒕  + 𝜷𝟔𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                            
(2) 
Where: 𝑮𝑶𝑽𝒊𝒕 takes for each time the value of the composite index calculated by the ACP, 
then it takes the value of an indicator among the six indicators of the quality of governance of 
Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi (2010) of the World Bank; 
In the second step, we study the indirect effect of foreign aid on economic growth through the 
governance variable, which is measured, first, by the composite index of six governance 
indicators of World Bank elaborated by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). In a second 
place, this variable corresponds to one sub-indicator of the six dimensions of governance. To 
do this, we introduce firstly the interaction between the aggregate index of governance and 
foreign aid. Then, we perform the same analysis by introducing each time an indicator of 
governance of the World Bank developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). Thus, our econometric 
approach is to perform the following tests for all the specifications of our models. 
 Fisher's global significance test; 
 The Hausman test to select the most appropriate model: fixed or random effects 
model; 
 The Breusch-Pagan test and the Wald test to test the existence of heteroscedasticity; 
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 The Wooldridge test that allows checking the presence of the autocorrelation of the 
error terms. 
In other words, we will study the role of the governance quality on the effectiveness of ODA 
by integrating, in a first place, the composite index of six indicators of the governance of the 
World Bank. This index is calculated based on the Principal Component Analysis method 
using the SPSS software. In a second place, we integrate separately the indicators of the good 
governance developed by Kaufman Kraay and Mastruzy (2010) (Voice and Responsibility 
(VR), Government Effectiveness (GE), Political Stability (PS), Quality of Regulation (QR), 
Control of Corruption (CC), Rule of Law (RL). It is quite possible that there are correlation 
effects between them. The results of the tests based on the correlation matrix (Table A.2.1) 
indicate obvious correlations between the six indicators. Therefore, estimating the dimensions 
of governance in our model would have led to erroneous results. Thus, the model is estimated 
by regressing each time one of the six governance indicators, thus avoiding any correlation 
effect. 
Then, we can formulate the equation to study in the following form: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕  = 𝜶𝟏  +𝜷𝟏𝒂𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟐𝑮𝑶𝑽𝒊𝒕+𝜷𝟑𝑮𝑶𝑽𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟓𝒎𝟐𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝒐𝒖𝒗𝒊𝒕  + 𝜷𝟕𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕  
+𝝁𝒊𝒕+𝜺𝒊𝒕               (3) 
GOV*apd refers to the interaction term between the quality of governance and aid 
effectiveness in order to test if the effectiveness of aid is conditioned by the quality of 
governance. 
3.2. Data Sources and stylized facts 
This study covers a cross-sectional panel of 48 African countries: 25 middle-income African 
countries and 23 low-income countries over a period covering 1996-2014. The choice of this 
period is dictated by the availability of data on indicators of governance starting from 1996. 
All data are from the statistics of the World Bank. With the exception of governance 
indicators that are collected from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and aggregated 
based on factorial analysis through Principal Component Analysis approach. 
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3.2.1. Principal component analysis 
For the construction of our index of governance, we are based on a statistical method - 
principal component analysis (PCA) – a technique able to group individual indicators that are 
collinear to form a composite indicator that captures as much as possible information 
common to individual indicators. Factor loads are coefficients that relate observed variables 
to principal components or factors. The square of the factor loads represents the proportion of 
the total variance of the indicator that is explained by the factor. The series that contributes 
most to the direction of the common variation in the data takes a higher weight. 
The factorial loads on the first main component are chosen as weight. Given the extended 
nature of the exercise, the first major component can be interpreted as a summary of the latent 
information on the quality of governance. For example, t summarizes the information on 
political and governance quality and represents more than 81% of the variance of the data in 
the case of middle income sample (Table A.1.10 in the appendix). 
The six sub-indicators of the World Bank's governance (2010) do not have the same weight in 
the construction of the composite index. We present the contribution of each sub-indicator in 
the explanation of the total variance of global governance (estimated by the first component) 
as explained in the previous paragraph and we note that the aggregate index of governance 
can be written as follows: 
𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒊  = 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑪𝒊  + 𝜶𝟐𝑮𝑬𝒊  + 𝜶𝟑𝑷𝑺𝒊  + 𝜶𝟒𝑹𝑸𝒊  + 𝜶𝟓𝑹𝑳𝒊  + 𝜶𝟔𝑽𝑨𝒊                                                                           
(4) 
With CC, GE, PS, RQ, RL and VA represent different sub-indices;𝛼1, 𝛼2.𝛼3, 𝛼4, 𝛼5, 𝛼6 denote 
the weighting of each variable (corresponding factorial loads on the first main component) to 
the construction of the index composite. 
Before performing our analysis of the PCA, it is essential to ensure that our data is 
factorizable5. In this context, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test, which is a precision index 
of sampling, is considered excellent (given that the KMO test exceeds 0.8) both in the case of 
low-income and middle income African countries. Also, the Bartlett test is significant even at 
the 1% threshold (p = 0.000 <0.001) for the case of the regions studied (see appendixesA.1.6 
and A.1.12). 
                                                             
5 According to Hair et al. (2010) the KMO index is excellent if its value between 0.8 and higher, KMO good if its value equals 0.7 and 
above, KMO mediocre when its value between 0.6 and more, KMO miserable when its value between 0.5 and more and KMO unacceptable 
when its value is less than 0.5. 
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According to the table of eigenvalues (Tables A.1.4and A.1.10)) the first two factorial axes 
explain 83.601% and 89.51% of the total information contained in the six initial active 
variables in the case of the studied regions respectively in low-income and medium-income 
countries. 
 It can be seen that the first axis represents 71.91% and 81.88% of the total variance 
respectively in the low-income and middle-income region of Africa. In other words, the first 
component makes it possible to synthesize more than half of the total inertia in the totality of 
the studied sample. So, the six governance indicators can be reduced to just one component to 
understand governance. 
Thus, our composite index is calculated as the linear combination of weighted governance 
indicators by the share of the variance explained by each variable in the first principal 
component. According to the results of the PCA, equations (4) and (5) describe the composite 
indices of the World Bank's governance indicators (2010), respectively, for low-income and 
for middle income African countries: 
𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒊  = 0,826 𝑪𝑪𝒊  + 0,857 𝑮𝑬𝒊  + 𝟎, 𝟖𝟏𝟎𝑷𝑺𝒊  + 𝟎, 𝟖𝟖𝟏𝑹𝑸𝒊  + 0,941 𝑹𝑳𝒊  + 𝟎, 𝟕𝟔𝟐𝑽𝑨𝒊                                           
(5)                      
𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒊  = 0,941 𝑪𝑪𝒊  + 0,943 𝑮𝑬𝒊  + 𝟎, 𝟕𝟗𝟗𝑷𝑺𝒊  + 𝟎, 𝟗𝟎𝟖𝑹𝑸𝒊  + 0,961 𝑹𝑳𝒊  + 𝟎, 𝟖𝟔𝟕𝑽𝑨𝒊                                           
(6)   
 
3.2.2. Sylized facts 
At the economic level, globalization is the main cause of strong inequalities between the 
North and South. It also strengthens the differences between countries of the South, which 
explains heterogeneity at the world level: African countries are marginalized while emerging 
countries experience rapid growth. Thus, aid for development would be seen as an instrument 
of international cooperation and aims to optimize the minimum welfare level of a 
marginalized population by financing projects that respect the natural and social environment. 
During the 2000s, governments gave major importance to the fight against poverty, aiming to 
achieve good governance and to protect the environment. With structural adjustment, several 
efforts have increased, but the standard of living in some African countries is deteriorating. 
Similarly, the level of poverty in some countries is increasing. Structural adjustment was 
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called into question because of poor privatization, chronic underinvestment in physical and 
human capital, and premature trade and financial liberalization. This adjustment gives priority 
to productive and social concerns, including the provision of basic services (health, education, 
etc.). This social change in aid is specifically supported by the adoption of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), hence a perfect analysis of the institutions and an emphasis on 
the quality of the legal environment. 
In recent years, Africa had achieved a turning point in its development and played a large role 
in the global economy. Regionally, growth differs from one region to another, reflecting 
different levels of development and natural endowment, the impact of climatic conditions and, 
in particular, the degree of political and social stability. Indeed, economic growth in low-
income Africa, as shown in Figure 1, has improved in the sense that GDP nearly doubled 
during the 1996-2013 period from 297,4 to 629,4 (with a growth rate of 111, 63%). 
Figure 1: Evolution (on average) of foreign aid, governance and economic growth in 
low-income African countries 
 
Similarly, economic growth in middle-income African countries (Figure 2) increased by 
142.05% over the same period, from 1622.7 in 1996 to 3927.9 in 2013. 
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Figure 2: Evolution (on average) of foreign aid, governance and economic growth in 
middle-income African countries 
 
The impressive growth experienced in recent years in Africa is explained by several factors, 
the most important of which are better macroeconomic management, strong domestic demand 
and a relatively more stable political climate. Nevertheless, at the external level, this growth is 
justified, in particular, by very high commodity prices, very strong economic cooperation 
with emerging countries, increased FDI flows, and a high level of ODA.  
As for aid flows received by African countries in recent years, Africa remains a major 
beneficiary of ODA. Indeed, the continent has recorded a sharp increase in terms of net flows 
of ODA. In fact, low-income African economies grew by 33.61% in net ODA received (on 
average) between 1996 and 2013, while falling from 61.38 to 45.49. During this same period, 
Africa's share of net ODA (on average) has risen sharply from 157.12 to 64.91, that is, with a 
growth rate of 142, 05%. 
In recent years, the selectivity of ODA is at the heart of the debate and is the subject of much 
criticism. Indeed, the main idea is to practice an optimal allocation of aid to fight against 
extreme poverty for example, according to certain criteria such as the level of needs and the 
degree of performance linked to the quality of governance of country in question. Thus, the 
quality of governance is a necessary condition for improving the effectiveness of aid in terms 
of economic growth, for this reason African countries are trying to improve their institutional 
qualities. 
According to the composite index of governance, the quality of governance is of poor quality 
in African economies. During the period 1996-2013, the values of the variable "governance" 
is below -0.31 (World Bank, 2013) in all countries regardless of income level, with the 
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exception of certain countries, namely Mauritius. , Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and 
Cabo Verde, where governance is good (governance values are above 0). 
Figure 3: Evolution (on average) of governance in low and middle income African 
countries 
 
Figure 3 shows that the quality of governance is poorer in low-income countries whose values 
(on average) vary between -0.88 and -0.77 between 1996 and 2013. However, governance 
values are in the range [-0.36; -0.41] in middle-income countries. 
It is true that the level of governance in middle-income countries is more important, but it 
decreases between 1996 and 2013, going from -0.36 to -0.41, ie with a rate of Decrease of 
(12.87%). The sharp decline in the level of governance was recorded during the years 2005, 
2011 and 2013 when the average level of governance fell sharply to reach its peak value 
which is equal to -0.414. 
On the other hand, the level of governance in low-income countries increased in the same 
period from -0.886 to -0.777, that is, with a growth rate of 12.34%. This development is 
remarkable, especially during the years 2006 and 2007 when the level of governance 
increases, respectively, to -0.735 to -0.7733.  
The declining of governance level in these countries is justified by the fact that the majority of 
its indicators weakened during this period. Indeed, with the exception of the "Voice and 
responsibility" indicator, which has been improved in recent years, especially between 2009 
and 2013, all other governance indicators have decreased over the period 2002-2013. 
Regarding the level of governance in low-income economies, it has seen a remarkable rise in 
the various governance indicators. Indeed, the level of the fight against corruption has 
increased on average from -0.805 to -0.835 between the periods 1996 and 2013. As for the 
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variable efficiency of governance, it has seen a remarkable increase during the same period. It 
increased on average between the periods 1996 and 2013 from -1,044 to -0,985. Similarly, the 
increase in governance is due in particular to the increase in the indicator of political stability 
level. This indicator increases on average from -0.882 to -0.770 during the same period of our 
study. Also, the regulatory quality indicator has risen dramatically in middle-income 
economies from -0.927 to -0.770. In addition, the rule of law indicator increased during the 
same period, it increased from -1.050 to -0.914. Similarly, the variable voice and 
responsibility increased from -0.477 to -0.391 during the same period. 
Figure 4a: Evolution (on average) of aggregate and desegregated governance measures 
in low-income African countries  
 
Figure 4 b: Evolution (on average) of aggregate and desegregated governance measures 
in middle-income African countries 
 
The declining of governance level in African middle-income economies is largely explained 
by the deterioration of the major sub-indicators. Indeed, the level of the fight against 
corruption has decreased; it has passed from -0.332 to -0.465 on average between 1996 and 
2013. Moreover, the governance effectiveness variable has declined significantly during the 
same period. It declined on average between 1996 and 2013, from -0.316 to -0.511. Similarly, 
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this decline is due to the deterioration of the indicator of political stability level. This indicator 
decreased on average from -0.383 to -0.422 during the same period of our study. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory quality indicator has risen dramatically in middle-income 
economies from -0.927 to -0.770. Also, the rule of law indicator increased during the same 
period, it increased from -0.469 to -0.467. Similarly, the voice and responsibility quality 
improved from -0.477 to -0.391. 
3.2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table1 contains the descriptive statistics of all the variables of interest used in our study. The 
main conclusion we can draw from this table is that, on average, global Africa has 
experienced a growth rate of around1528.572. While middle-income African countries know 
a growth rate of 2567.446, low-income economies grew at a rate of411.2482 on average. The 
minimum value of growth rates in middle-income economies is recorded in Ghana in 2000. 
However, this low growth rate in low-income Africa is recorded in Liberia in 1996. On the 
other hand, the maximum value of Growth in the middle-income economies is in the order of 
14396.05 in Libya in 2008 while the maximum value in low-income African economies is 
1031.105, specifically in Zimbabwe in 2014. 
For the variable aid, Africa received an average of 58.06605where middle-income and low-
income countries received, on average respectively66.68203 and 48.80491million dollars. We 
find that middle-income economies attract an amount of aid more important than low-income 
economies. Indeed, middle-income countries reaches a maximum value of received aids of 
672.4556million dollars(in Cabo Verde in 2010), while the minimum value of aid received is 
-11.64525in Maurice  in 2003. 
Regarding aid volumes received by low-income African economies, we note that these 
volumes range from 2.790422(in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998) to 358.0125(in 
Liberia in 2010). 
Moreover, the level of governance is generally low in African countries, on average the index 
of governance achieved (-0.543).Indeed, the highest value is recorded in Botswana in 2003 in 
middle-income economies (0.780), while the highest value of governance in low-income 
economies was marked in Benin (-0.034) in 1998. On the other hand, the minimum value of 
the governance index in Middle-income Africa is reached in Angola (-1.49) in 2000. While 
the lowest value of the index of governance in low-income African countries (-1.88) was 
marked in Congo Democratic Republic in 1998. 
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Table 1: Data description 
Full sample 
Variable gdp Apd Gov Inf m2 pop Ouv 
Obs 907 859 719 902 861 912 897 
Mean 1528.5 58.066 -.543 19.63 33.54 2.423 .726 
Std. Dev. 2050.6 67.862 .509 185.42 22.385 .909 .334 
Min 72.746 -11.645 -1.886 -27.048 1.617 -.277 .178. 
Max 14396.0 672.45 .780 4800.5 151.548 7.988 2.098 
Middle-income African countries 
Obs 470 445 375 465 458 475 465 
Mean 2567.4 66.68 -.392 21.83 42.14 2.023 .859 
Std. Dev. 2416.2 87.73 .559 224.79 25.57 .752 .361 
Min 263.11 -11.64 -1.496 -25.31 8.578 -.277 .178 
Max 14396.0 672.45 .780 4800.53 131.71 3.555 2.098 
Low-income African countries 
Obs 437 414 344 437 403 437 432 
Mean 411.24 48.804 -.707 17.287 23.778 2.858 .584 
Std. Dev. 208.09 33.562 .387 131.395 12.1793 .865 .227 
Min 72.746 2.790 -1.886 -27.048 1.617 -.123 .209 
Max 1031.10 358.01 -.034 2630.123 151.548 7.988 1.791 
To gain a general understanding of the data, summary statistics describing the correlation 
between the different variables is presented in Table (2) 6 . According to this table, all 
correlation coefficients are weak and do not exceed 0.50.  For example, economic growth and 
development assistance are negatively and weakly correlated for the case of middle-income 
African countries. However, these two variables are weakly and positively correlated in the 
case of low-income countries. So, we can accept absence of multicolonearity in our data. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 Note that two techniques are usually used: the realization of a matrix of correlations and the calculation of VIFs ("Variance Inflation  
Factors"). The correlation matrix allows a two-by-two analysis of the correlations between the explanatory variables. We consider that 
obtaining correlation coefficients greater than 0.5 is indicative of a problem of multicollinearity. Similarly, a problem of multicollinearity is 
noted when a VIF has a value greater than or equal to 10 and / or when the average of the VIFs is greater than or equal to 2.  If neither of 
these two values is reached, the impact of multicollinearity is, according to these authors, not worrying and all the explanatory variables can 
thus be preserved for the analysis, the latter being then not “distorted” by the existing level of multicollinearity.  
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Table 2 : Correlation matrix  
Full sample 
  lngdp apdlnm Gov Inf m2 pop Ouv 
lngdp 1.0000 
     
  
apdlnm -0.0239 1.0000 
    
  
gov 0.4371 0.3048 1.0000 
   
  
inf -0.0397 -0.0594 -0.1082 1.0000 
  
  
m2 0.5492 0.0635 0.5536 -0.1022 1.0000 
 
  
pop -0.5505 0.0732 -0.3428 0.0296 -0.5374 1.0000   
ouv 0.4103 0.1497 0.2111 0.0593 0.2284 -0.3509 1.0000 
Middle-income African countries  
lngdp 1.0000 
     
  
apdlnm -0.0129 1.0000 
    
  
gov 0.3701 0.3644 1.0000 
   
  
inf -0.0990 -0.0089 -0.1063 1.0000 
  
  
m2 0.4545 0.0569 0.5509 -0.0434 1.0000 
 
  
pop -0.4486 -0.0189 -0.4691 0.0824 -0.6311 1.0000   
ouv 0.1676 0.1982 0.1414 0.1020 -0.0027 -0.3276 1.0000 
Low-income African countries 
lngdp 1.0000 
     
  
apdlnm 0.2888 1.0000 
    
  
gov 0.2555 0.2851 1.0000 
   
  
inf -0.0013 -0.2379 -0.1558 1.0000 
  
  
m2 0.2675 0.2361 0.3982 -0.3020 1.0000 
 
  
pop -0.1018 0.1670 0.1308 -0.0240 -0.1504 1.0000   
ouv 0.1817 0.2119 -0.0016 -0.0791 0.2073 0.0486 1.0000 
In the next step of the analysis, we conduct a static panel specification where a fixed effect 
and random effect regression will be estimated. But, we think that before the transition to this 
regression, a unit root test is necessary in order to have an idea about the stationarity of the 
variables. 
Table 3 presents results of Unit root tests and show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of unit root (not stationary) for all variables at level. So, we can see that all the variables are 
not stationary at level but become stationary in first difference for both cases (Africa-low 
income and Africa-middle income), based on the two tests of Levin, Lin & Chu t* (2002) and 
the test of Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (2003). In other words, our variables are integrated of 
same order and can have long-run relationship.  
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Table 3:Unit root tests  
 
Low income countries  Intermediate income countries  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat Levin, Lin & Chu t* Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 
Constant and trend Constant and trend Constant and trend Constant and trend 
Prob 
I(0) 
  Prob  
I(1) 
Prob 
I(0) 
Prob 
I(1) 
Prob 
I(0) 
Prob 
I(1) 
Prob 
I(0) 
Prob 
I(1) 
Y 0.3040 0.0000*** 0.7852 0.0000***  0.4492 0.0000***  1.0000 0.0000*** 
apd 0.9025 0.0001*** 0.7801 0.0000*** 0.2656 0.0000*** 0.5223 0.0000*** 
inf 0.0556 0.0000*** 1.0000 0.0000***  0.9192 0.0015*** 1.0000 0.0000*** 
m2 0.6097 0.0000*** 0.9696 0.0000*** 0.4353 0.0000*** 0.8922 0.0000*** 
ouv 0.3193 0.0000*** 0.8741 0.0000***  0.0042 0.0000*** 0.1046 0.0000*** 
pop 1.0000 0.0000*** 1.0000 0.0000*** 1.0000 0.0000*** 1.0000 0.0000*** 
***indicates statistical significance at 1% threshold level. 
4. Results and interpretations  
4.1. Impact of foreign aid on economic growth 
From the results presented in Table 4, the Fisher test shows an overall significance for all 
variables in our model, implying that the model is globally significant at 1% threshold 
(column 2). Thus, the Hausman test7 shows that the fixed-effects model is preferable to the 
random-effects model in the African country as a whole and in the middle-income African 
countries. On the other hand, the random effect model is more appropriate in low-income 
African countries. We retain the fixed-effects model for low-income countries because the 
probability (0.0000) is less than 10%, whereas in the case of middle-income countries, we 
retain the random effects model since the probability (0.4599) is greater this critical value. 
By rejecting the hypothesis of homoscedasticity, the Breush-Pagan test and the Wald test 
reveal the existence of heteroscedasticity in the model to be estimated. Similarly, the 
Wooldridge test shows the existence of a problem of autocorrelation of errors. To correct 
these two types of problems, we will present the results of generalized least squares (GLS) 
(columns 4, 7 and 10).  
Table 4 shows that the foreign aid coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively, in the full sample and Low Income African countries (Columns 4 
and 10) and in middle income countries  (column 6). Indeed, the aid ratio coefficient is more 
important in low-income countries than in Africa as a whole and in middle-income countries. 
We can see that low-income countries are more sensitive to international assistance for 
                                                             
7
We accept the null hypothesis of fixed effect model if the Haussmann probability is less than critical value threshold and we accept 
alternative hypothesis of random effect model otherwise. 
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development and more especially a 1% increase in the amount of development aid leads to an 
increase of 9.36% in economic growth in this type of countries contrary to a 3.25% in middle-
income countries. This finding can be explained by the classical theory of convergence since 
in the sense that poor countries are more far from their stationary states and are expected to 
have a higher growth rate than more developed for the same level of inputs. This implies that 
foreign aid is considered as an engine of economic growth for the development of African 
economies regardless of income level. These results are similar to those found by Mekasha 
and Tarp (2013) and Nwaogu and Ryan (2015). 
The coefficient associated with the inflation variable is not significant in middle income 
countries but surprisingly positive and statistically significant at 1% threshold. This result 
contradicts most of the previous conclusion in this field such us: in the case of high an 
unstable level of inflation expectations are difficult and lead to misleading results. So, long-
run investment decisions slow down and subsequently resulting economic activities decrease. 
This result can be explained by the fact that in the presence of international aid economic 
agents are becoming more optimistic. They become more confident and more insured seeing 
an increase in general price levels as a good sign on the health of the economy such as an 
increase in consumption encourages investment and as a result stimulates economic growth. 
Otherwise, foreign aid in poor African countries is seen as a kind of explicit guarantee that 
encourages the risk-taking behavior of investors affecting positively economic growth 
independently of crises likelihood. 
The coefficient of money supply in M2 sense relative to the GDP is positive and statistically 
significant at the1% threshold in the full sample when applying the GLS method. This finding 
is similar to the results of Burnside and Dollar (2000).This implies that the financial depth 
according to the level of country’s financial development positively affects economic growth. 
The population variable has a negative and statistically significant effect at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively, in Africa and Middle-income Africa. This result suggests that population 
growth has contributed in a negative and significant way to the economic growth of these 
regions. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient associated with the variable that measures commercial openness 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% threshold for middle income countries. This 
result can be explained, in large part, by bad quality of governance and by financial markets 
underdeveloped unable to cope with new demands for services and products increasingly 
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sophisticated given the entry of new international participants and the presence of 
multinational firms. In addition, our results show the inability of African markets in their 
current situations to cope with the competition of international operators who benefit, to a 
large extent, from efficient subsidies and easy regulations reducing production costs in their 
country of origin or who benefit from tariff cuts under unbalanced multilateral agreements. 
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Table 4: Effect of foreign aid on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS 
oda 
-.0401 
(.0330) 
.2420 
(.025)*** 
.0470 
(.0139)*** 
-.0039 
(.036) 
.1733 
(.031)*** 
.0325 
(.014)** 
.2691 
(.041)*** 
.2999 
(.039)*** 
.0936 
(.022)*** 
inf 
-.00007 
(.001) 
-.00011 
(.001) 
.00008 
(.001)* 
-.00029 
(.001)* 
-.00029 
(.001)*** 
-.00001 
(.001) 
.00044 
(.001)** 
.00054 
(.001)*** 
.00038 
(.001)*** 
 m2 
.6537 
(.055)*** 
.5313 
(.055)*** 
.0897 
(.035)** 
.5336 
(.087)*** 
1.085 
(.094) 
-.0370 
(.067) 
.1737 
(.049)*** 
.2012 
(.055)*** 
.0255 
(.035) 
pop 
-.2922 
(.038)*** 
-.0073 
(.026) 
-.1436 
(.030)*** 
-.2313 
(.072)*** 
-.0107 
(.059)*** 
-.14340 
(.056)** 
-.0815 
(.027)*** 
-.0015 
(.024) 
.0098 
(.022) 
ouv 
.8021 
(.091)*** 
-.3407 
(.110)*** 
-.0229 
 (.064) 
.2597 
(.118)** 
-.7818 
(.170)*** 
-.1941 
(.084)** 
.3086 
(.108)*** 
.2684 
(.127)** 
-.0644 
(.071) 
constant 
4.775 
(.260)*** 
4.296 
(.1764)*** 
6.499 
(.156)*** 
5.774 
(.461)*** 
3.647 
(.374)*** 
7.918 
(.298)*** 
4.372 
(.203)*** 
3.961 
(.193)*** 
5.505 
(.152)*** 
Observations 805 805 805 421 421 421 384 384 384 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4420 0.1261  0.2690 0.1376  0.2110 0.1916  
R-squaredwithin  0.2795   0.4107   0.2980  
R-squared between  0.0864   0.0754   0.0883  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000   
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.0000   0.0000   0.4599   
Breusch pagan (p> chi2)       0.0000   
Wald test 0.000   0.0000      
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.2. Impact of governance on economic growth 
In a second part of this work, we will study the effect of foreign aid on economic growth by 
first introducing the governance variable in order to assess its impact on economic growth. 
Then, we will try to test if the importance (coefficient) of foreign aid improves in the presence 
of the governance variable. Thus, our model can be extended as presented in equation (2).  
Results of the static panel regression adding to first equation governance variable are 
presented in table 5. The main conclusion we can drown from these results is that good 
governance can stimulate economic growth too significantly (1% threshold) for all countries 
types. Our result is similar to the findings of Helliwel (1994) suggesting a strong correlation 
link between democracy as a proxy for governance quality and economic growth. In other 
words, he supported that democracy ensures long-run general rules favoring short–run 
investment decision and so economic growth.  Similarly, other works showed that democracy 
is a primordial condition to guarantee property rights and contracts (Clague et al., 1996). In 
this sense, democratic countries are more likely to attract foreign direct investment than in the 
autocratic regimes and economic development. In addition, high institutional quality exerts a 
larger positive quantitative effect on overall productive factor, especially on human capital 
accumulation (Rodrik et al., 2001) and encourages the accumulation of factors of production 
(Eicher et al., 2008).  Given these findings previously done and our results, we can conclude 
that governance may be a major determinant of economic growth and affect the effectiveness 
of foreign help for development.       
In addition, the coefficient associated with the variable aid is positive (0.03) and statistically 
significant at the 10% threshold (GLS model) for the case of the overall sample. We then 
observe that this coefficient has decreased in the case of the full sample and become not 
significant for the middle-income countries with the introduction of the governance variable 
in the model (2). However, this coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% threshold, 
using the GLS method, for low-income African countries. So, the inclusion of governance in 
our model for these less developed countries has improved aid effectiveness in terms of 
economic growth (while going from 0.09 for the GLS model (equation (1)) to 0.106 for the 
GLS model (eq (2))). This result implies that a 1% increase of international assistance for 
development addressed to less developed African countries can lead to an economic growth 
of more than 10%.On the basis of this conclusion, we will test in the next sub-section whether 
the relationship between aid and economic growth depends on the level of governance since 
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the governance variable is positively and significantly associated with the level of economic 
growth. In other words, our objective will be to study the effectiveness of aid according to the 
level of governance since the results have changed with the introduction of this variable. In 
the rest of this section we test the effect of each component of governance in economic 
growth.  
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Table 5: Effect of governance on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
Oda 
-.1422 
(.037)*** 
.1879 
(.028)*** 
.0314 
(.016)* 
-.0966 
(.042)** 
.1329 
(.033)*** 
.0196 
(.016) 
.2014 
(.048)*** 
.3176 
(.048)*** 
.1061 
(.025)*** 
Gov 
.4094 
(.077)*** 
.1813 
(.108)* 
.4068 
(.064)*** 
.2658 
(.097)*** 
  .2729 
(.146)* 
.2966 
(.085)*** 
.2294 
(.077)*** 
-.1704 
(.125) 
.2300 
(.079)*** 
 Inf 
-.0000314 
(.001) 
-.0001 
(.001)* 
.0001 
(.001)*** 
-.0002 
(.001) 
-.0003 
(.001)*** 
.00001 
(.001) 
.0004 
(.001)** 
0005 
(.001)*** 
.0004 
(.001)*** 
 m2 
.4683 
(.068)*** 
.5723 
(.061)*** 
.0865 
(.039)** 
.4115 
(.102)*** 
.9457 
(.097) 
.0126 
(.070) 
.1315 
(.060)** 
.2687 
(.067)*** 
.0094 
(.041) 
Pop 
-.3043 
(.042)*** 
-.0081 
(.030) 
-.0925 
(.025)*** 
-.1836 
(.077)** 
-.0034 
(.065)** 
-.1441 
(.052)*** 
-.0911 
(.033)*** 
.0002 
(.028) 
.0060 
(.019) 
Ouv 
.7720 
(.099)*** 
-.3030 
(.120)** 
-.0330 
(.069) 
.3068 
(.129)** 
-.4212 
(.176)*** 
-.1634 
(.096)* 
.2596 
(.115)** 
.2508 
(.143)* 
-.0806 
(.076) 
Constant 
6.09 
(.346)*** 
4.482 
(.216)*** 
6.719 
(.174)*** 
6.586 
(.549)*** 
4.140 
(.443)*** 
7.888 
(.317)*** 
5.001 
(.292)*** 
3.602 
(.252)*** 
5.704 
(.185)*** 
Observations 672 672 672 355 355 355 317 317 317 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4666 0.1793  0.2830 0.1697  0.1855 0.1173  
R-squaredwithin  0.2632     0.3791   0.3064  
R-squared between  0.1516   0.1180   0.0120     
Fischer (prob> F) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000   0.0000 0.0000  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.0000   0.1989   0.0000   
Breusch pagan (p> chi2)    0.000      
Wald test 0.000      0.000   
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Tables from 6 to 12 present results of the effect of each indicator of governance on economic 
growth. For global African countries, improving the effectiveness of foreign aid by increasing 
governance is justified by the increase in the coefficient of foreign aid when introducing 
governance sub-indicators into our model. Indeed, this coefficient has increased from 0.03 in 
equation (1) to (0.043),(0.038),(0.036),(0.046),(0.041) and (0.035) upon introduction of 
indicators measuring, corruption control, government effectiveness, political stability, quality 
of regulation, rule of law and voice and accountability, respectively. 
Concerning low-income African economies, aid effectiveness has improved as a result of the 
introduction of the following governance indicators: corruption control, political stability, the 
rule of law, and voice and accountability. Indeed, the coefficient of development aid has 
increased from (0.09) to (0.125), (0.108), (0.116) and (0.114) respectively for these four 
indicators. 
Nevertheless, the coefficient of development aid is positive but not significant for the case of 
medium-income African countries. So, it seems that governance has no role in improving aid 
effectiveness in terms of economic growth for African middle-income economies. However, 
with the inclusion of the Regulatory Quality Indicator, international aid remains effective and 
significant at the 10% level in terms of economic growth, but this efficiency has slightly 
decreased, the aid coefficient has dropped from 0.032 (Table 4) in the first equation to 0.029 
in the second equation (Table 9) . 
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Table 6.Effect of control of corruption on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS RE GLS 
oda 
-.1121 
(.037)*** 
.1971 
(.027)*** 
.0431 
(.016)*** 
-.0764 
(.041)* 
.1323 
(.033)*** 
.0271 
(.017) 
.2388 
(.047)*** 
.3192 
(.044)*** 
.1251 
(.026)*** 
cc 
.2346 
(.071)*** 
-.0603  
(.072) 
.1560 
(.041)*** 
.1618 
(.085)* 
.0834 
(.095) 
.1096 
(.050)** 
-.0773 
(.079) 
-.2600 
(.084)*** 
.0495 
(.053) 
inf 
-.00005 
(.001) 
-.0001 
(.001)* 
.0001 
(.001)** 
-.0002 
(.001)* 
-.0003 
(.001)*** 
.00002 
(.001) 
.0004 
(.001)** 
.0005 
(.001)*** 
.0004 
(.001)*** 
 m2 
.5450 
(.067)*** 
.5681 
(.061)*** 
.1262 
(.041)*** 
.4633 
(.101)*** 
.9767 
(.097)*** 
.0295 
(.071) 
.2228 
(.059)*** 
.2689 
(.062)*** 
.0560 
(.043) 
pop 
-.2972 
(.044)*** 
.0008 
(.030) 
-.1142 
(.028)*** 
-.1784 
(.079)** 
.0273 
(.067) 
-.1308 
(.053)** 
-.0717 
(.033)** 
-.0134 
(.027) 
.0037 
(.021) 
ouv 
.7652 
(.101)*** 
-.3092 
(.121)** 
.0036 
(.073) 
.3043 
(.130)** 
-.4478 
(.178)** 
-.1695 
(.096)* 
.2001 
(.115)* 
.2404 
(.132)* 
-.0344 
(.082) 
constant 
5.636 
(.336)*** 
4.313 
(.204)*** 
6.438 
(.177)*** 
6.285 
(.539)*** 
3.922 
(.434)*** 
7.705 
(.317)*** 
4.340 
(.280)*** 
3.546 
(.237)*** 
  5.354 
(.183)*** 
Observations 672 672 672 354 354 354 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4531 0.1198  0.2754 0.1520  0.1699 0.1514  
R-squaredwithin  0.2616   0.3726   0.3261  
R-squared between  0.0891   0.0975   0.0436  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000   10.61  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.0000 0.9678 0.7421 
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)  0.000 0.000 
Wald test                       0.000   
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Effect of government effectiveness on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
Oda 
-.1038 
(.035)*** 
.2052 
(.027)*** 
.0384 
(.016)** 
-.0590 
(.040) 
.1332 
(.033)*** 
.0247 
(.017) 
.2320 
(.047)*** 
.3419 
(.045)*** 
.1197 
(.026) 
Eg 
.3871 
(.065)*** 
-.2907 
(.081)*** 
.2129 
(.045)*** 
.1013 
(.090) 
-.1812 
(.116) 
.1157 
(.062)* 
.0634 
(.064) 
-.3696 
(.090)*** 
.0870 
(.055) 
 Inf 
-.00008 
(.001) 
-.0001 
(.000)* 
.0001 
(.000)** 
-.0002 
(.000)* 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00009 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.000)** 
.0005 
(.000)*** 
.0004 
(.000) 
 m2 
.4340 
069)*** 
.5649 
(.061)*** 
.0886 
(.040)** 
.4734 
(.105)*** 
.9832 
(.097)*** 
.0424 
(.072) 
.1826 
(.060)*** 
.2652 
(.065)*** 
.0311 
(.042) 
Pop 
-.2874 
(.043)*** 
.0080 
(.030) 
-.0888 
(.026)*** 
-.1975 
(.079)** 
.0387 
(.067) 
-.1401 
(.054)** 
-.0806 
(.033)** 
-.0004 
(.027) 
.0052 
(.020) 
ouv 
.8008 
(.099)*** 
-.3105 
(.119)** 
-.0287 
(.070) 
.3288 
(.131)** 
-.5135 
(.177)*** 
-.1527 
(.098) 
.2383 
(.118)** 
.2342 
(.138)* 
-.0502 
(.080) 
constant 
6.052 
(.332)*** 
4.112 
(.209)*** 
6.593 
(.175)*** 
6.179 
(.546)*** 
3.811 
(437)*** 
7.669 
(.324)*** 
4.614 
(.275)*** 
3.296 
(.239)*** 
5.503 
(.186) 
Observations 672 672 672 354 354 354 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4721 0.0252  0.2706 0.1116  0.1699 0.0950  
R-squaredwithin  0.2757   0.3759   0.3415  
R-squared between  0.0026   0.0559   0.0045  
Fischer (prob> F) 99.10 54.45  21.45   10.61 20.81  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.0000  0.9825     
Breuschpagan (p> chi2) 0.000  0.0004 
Wald test  0.000  
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Effect of political stability on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
Oda 
-.1630 
(.037)*** 
.1928 
(.027) 
.0360 
(.015)** 
-.1613 
(.0407) *** 
.1416   
(.033) *** 
.0217 
(.016) 
.1864 
(.0473)*** 
.2904 
(.047)*** 
.1086 
(.025)*** 
Sp 
.2658 
(.040)*** 
.1412 
(.037) 
.0995 
(.023)*** 
.3429 
(.0528)*** 
.2167 
(.054)*** 
.1448 
(.035)*** 
.1490 
(.033)*** 
.0164  
(.043) 
.0511   
(.025) ** 
 Inf 
.00008 
(.000) 
-.00009 
(.000) 
.0001 
(.000)** -.0001 (.000) 
-.00026 
(.000)*** 
.00001 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.000)** 
.0005 
(.000) *** 
.0003  
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.5028 
(.063)*** 
.5714 
(.060) 
.0766 
(.040)* 
.3952 
(.092)*** 
.8930 
(.096) *** 
.0625 
(.070) 
.1061   
(.058)* 
.2817 
(.067) *** .0016 (.041) 
pop 
-.3197 
(.042)*** 
-.01751 
(.030) 
-.0852 
(.025)*** 
-.1809 (.073) 
** 
-.0595 
(.066) 
-.1625  
(.052) *** 
-.0856 
(.032)*** 
.0017 
(.028) 
.0096  
(.019) 
ouv 
.6743 
(.100)*** 
-.2889 
(.119) 
-.0217 
(.068) 
.1294 
(.127) 
-.4084   
(.170) ** 
-.1658  
(.096)* 
.2340   (.112) 
** 
.2275 
(.142) 
-.0642 
(.078) 
constant 
6.090 
(.325)*** 
4.458 
(.201) 
6.539 
(.167)*** 
7.049 
(.509)*** 
4.363 
(.433)*** 
7.682 
(.312)*** 
5.088 
(.270)*** 
3.806  
(.219) 
5.581   
(.177) *** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4781 0.1994  0.346 0.21  0.217 0.161  
R-squaredwithin  0.2773   0.39   0.304  
R-squared between  0.1810   0.16   0.06  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.0000 0.1940 0.0000 
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)  0.0000  
Wald test 0.000  0.000 
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000 0.0000 0.000 
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table  9. Effect of regulatory environment quality on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
oda 
-.1137 
(.035) *** 
.1914   
(.028) *** 
.0460 
(.016) *** 
-.0723 
(.039)* 
.1326 
(.033)*** 
.0299 
(.017)* 
.2197 
(.046)*** 
.3017   
.046*** 
.1196 
(.025)*** 
Qr 
.4280   
(.061) *** .0738 (.078) 
.0957 
(.048) ** 
.2004 
(.085) ** 
.1345 
(.109) 
-.0191 
(.064) 
.2041 
(.056) *** 
-.0592 
(.093) 
.0730 
(.055) 
 Inf 
-0.00006   -
(.000) 
-.0001  
(.000)* 
.0001 
(.000) ** 
-.0002  
(.000) 
-.0003   
(.000) *** 
.00002 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.000)*** 
.0005   
.000*** 
.0004 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.4597 
(.065)*** 
.5753 (.061) 
*** 
.1349 
(.041) *** 
.4416 
(.100) *** 
.9709 
(.097) *** 
.0486 
(.072) 
.1586 
(.056) *** 
.2723  
.067*** 
.0470 
(.043) 
Pop 
-.3054 
(.042)*** 
-.0031  
(.030) 
-.1072 
(.027) *** 
-.1925 
(.077)** 
.0166 
(.065) 
-.1376 
(.054) ** 
-.1000 
(.033)*** 
.00024   
.028 
.0048 
(.020) 
Ouv 
.8151 
(.098)*** 
-.3041   
(.121) ** 
-.0072 
(.072) 
.3480  
(.130) *** 
-.4337  
(.177) ** 
-.1727 
(.096)* 
.2861 
 (.115)** 
.2425   
.144* 
-.0561 
(.079) 
Constant 
6.026 
(.318) *** 
4.395 
(.206)*** 
6.348 
(.178)*** 
6.353 
(.529) 
3.972 
(.433) *** 
7.589 
(.322) 
4.863 
(.258)*** 
3.728   
.231*** 
5.423 
(.179)*** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.47 0.162   0.154  0.2008 0.1389  
R-squaredwithin  0.261   0.37   0.3047  
R-squared between  0.133   0.099   0.0348  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.0000 0.191 0.0000 
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)  0.000  
Wald test 0.000  0.0000 
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10.Effect of the rule of law on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
oda 
-.1231 
(.036) *** 
.1888 
(.027) 
.0419 
(.016) ** 
-.0847 
(.041)** 
.1349 
(.033)*** 
.0269 
(.017) 
.2246 
(.047)*** 
.2854 
(.047)*** 
.1169 
(.025)*** 
Ed 
.3182 
(.064) *** 
.1856 
(.080) 
.2466 
(.047)*** 
.1980 
(.089)** 
.0581 
(.121) 
.1257 
(.066)* 
.1311 
(.057)** 
.0698 
(.088) 
.1551 
(.052)*** 
 Inf 
-.00003 
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000) 
.0001 
(.000) *** 
-.0002 
(.000) 
-.0003 
(.000) 
.00002 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.000)** 
.0005 
(.000)*** 
.0004 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.4600 
(.070) *** 
.5658 
(.061) 
.1045 
(.040) ** 
.4095 
(.106)*** 
.9546 
(.101)*** 
.0260 
( .072) 
.1534 
(.060)** 
.2852 
(.067)*** 
.0265 
(.042) 
Pop 
-.3028 
(.043) *** 
-.0026 
(.030) 
-.0968 
(.026) *** 
-.1803 
(.078)** 
.0071 
(.066) 
-.1359 
(.053)** 
-.0899 
(.033)*** 
.0048 
(.028) 
.0079 
(.020) 
Ouv 
.7629 
(.099) *** 
-.3283 
(.121) 
-.0224 
(.072) 
.3089 
(.130)** 
-.4513 
(.176)** 
-.1569 
(.097) 
.2355 
(.115)** 
.2010 
(.146) 
-.0874 
(.078) 
Constant 
6.047 
(.347) *** 
4.532 
(.215) 
6.568 
(.178) *** 
6.529 
(.560)*** 
4.024 
(.459)*** 
7.734 
(.324)*** 
4.816 
(.279)*** 
3.871 
(.238)*** 
5.590 
(.181)*** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared  0.17  0.2778 0.1498  0.1811 0.1585  
R-squaredwithin  0.266   0.3694   0.3052  
R-squared between  0.15   0.0971   0.0549  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000   0.000 0.000  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.000 0.9982 0.0410 
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)  0.0000  
Wald test 0.000                           0.0000 
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table  11. Effect of voice and responsibility on economic growth 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS RE GLS 
oda 
-.1161 
 (.039)*** 
.1866 
(.028) *** 
.0352 
(.016)** 
-.0466 
(.043) 
.1277 
(.034)*** 
.0207 
(.017) 
1956 
(.051***) 
.2970 
(.046)*** 
.1141 
(.025)*** 
Vr 
.1250 
(.055)** 
.0879 
(.064) 
.1500 
(.038)*** 
-.0136 
(.066) 
.1006 
(.094) 
.1390 
(.052)*** 
.1076 
(.056*) 
-.0390 
(.066) 
.0811 
(.039)** 
 Inf 
-.00006 
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000)* 
.00014   
(.000)*** 
-.00029 
(.000)* 
-.0003 
(.000)*** 
.00003 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.000**) 
.0005 
(.000)*** 
.0003 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.5737 
(.067)*** 
.5657 
(.061)*** 
.1220 
(.041)*** 
.5229 
(.101)*** 
.9653 
(.097)*** 
.0389 
(.071) 
.1689 
(.058***) 
.2765 
(.063)*** 
.0135 
(.042) 
Pop 
-.3280 
(.043)*** 
-.0097 
(.030) 
-.1206 
(.027) *** 
-.2213 
(.077)*** 
.0120 
(.065) 
-.1575 
(.053)*** 
-.0854 
(.033**) 
-.0037 
(.028 
.0050 
(.020) 
Ouv 
.8009 
(.101)*** 
-.3106 
(.121)** 
.0169  
(.073) 
.3142 
(.131)** 
-.4618 
(.177)*** 
-.1858 
(.097)* 
.2364  
(.115**) 
.2427 
(.134)* 
-.0596 
(.079) 
Constant 
5.536 
(.349)*** 
4.473 
(.220)*** 
6.481 
(.182)*** 
5.965 
(.556)*** 
4.034 
(.442)*** 
7.778 
(.320)*** 
4.823 
(.298***) 
3.754 
(.261)*** 
5.564 
(.185)*** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.44 0.148  0.2677 0.1393  0.177 0.1495    
R-squaredwithin  0.262   0.3745   0.3051    
R-squared between  0.117   0.0848   0.0426  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000   0.000   
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.000 0.1445 0.1814 
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)  0.000 0.000 
Wald test 0.000   
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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4.3. Effect of the governance on the relationship between international aid and economic 
growth 
Previous works have focused on the study of the effect of international assistance for 
development on economic growth but no work has analyzed this effect depending on 
governance quality. Our contribution is to test the effect of the aggregate and disaggregated 
governance quality on the relationship between the amount of foreign aid and the level of 
economic growth. Taking into account our second model (equation2) and in relation with our 
problematic, we introduced in the third specification (equation3), another exogenous variable 
namely the interaction term between governance quality and the variable aid for development 
(Gov*apd). The interaction variable is used as an exogenous variable to assess the 
significance of governance in reinforcing the effectiveness of international supports for 
development. 
This methodology permits us test the effect of interaction between our variables of interest 
and to respond to the question of the critical threshold which conditions the significance of 
the expected effects. From where, we present in the following section the indirect relationship 
between official development aid and economic growth according to institutional 
development of African countries. To estimate this model, we will first use the OLS method 
to check the significance of our explanatory variables but this method remains biased since it 
does not take into account the problem of autocorrelation and heterocedasticity. For this 
reason, we opted for the GLS regression. 
In table 12, we present the results of the static panel analysis using firstlythe OLS method 
taking into account interaction term. The conditional effect of international aid on economic 
growth through the governance quality takes the form of the specification presented in 
equation 3 as follow:  
𝒀𝒊𝒕  = 𝜶𝟏  +𝜷𝟏𝒂𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟐𝑮𝑶𝑽𝒊𝒕+𝜷𝟑𝑮𝑶𝑽𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒑𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝒑𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟓𝒎𝟐𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝒐𝒖𝒗𝒊𝒕  + 𝜷𝟕𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕  
+𝝁𝒊𝒕+𝜺𝒊𝒕.  
As explained previously, the expected sign of𝜷𝟏 is ambiguous. If 𝜷𝟏 >0, the conventional 
view that international assistance for development drives growth holds. Alternatively, 𝜷𝟏<0 
implies support for unconventional vision, in which case increase in international aid for 
development is associated with complacency and indifference behavior  leading to a decline 
in economic growth. The expected sign of  𝜷𝟐 , which represents the direct effect of the 
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governance quality on economic activity, is also theoretically ambiguous. The expected sign 
of the coefficient of the interaction term 𝜷𝟑is alsouncertain for reasons previously discussed, 
and is ultimately an empirical question. If 𝜷𝟑has the same sign as  𝜷𝟏, then the direct effect of 
aid will be reinforced at higher levels of  governance quality. On the other hand, if 𝜷𝟑and 
𝜷𝟏are of opposite signs, more improvement of governance quality will weaken the direct 
effect of international aid. 
The results of the GLS regression are presented in columns (4), (7) and (10) of each of the 
tables (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18). Table (12) indicates that equation (3) is tested 
using the composite index of six governance indicators. While Tables (13), (14), (15), (16), 
(17) and (18) indicate that equation 3 is tested by taking into account each of the six 
indicators of governance each time. In other words, the "GOV" variable takes the aggregated 
index and the six governance dimensions each time. 
Aid is effective in terms of economic growth, in the presence of governance, if and only if the 
coefficient of the variable of the interaction between aid and governance (that is, the 
coefficient of the variable "Apd * GOV") is statistically significant. Indeed, the results of the 
regressions presented in the tables (12) show that international aid is effective in terms of 
economic growth only in the case of African economies as a whole as well as low-income 
African economies. In fact, the coefficients of the interaction between aid and governance 
(apd * gov) (columns 4 and 10) are positive and significantly correlated with economic 
growth. However, the magnitude of the interaction coefficients varies according to the sample 
studied. In fact, the coefficient of the composite index in interaction with foreign aid is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in global Africa when using GLS model. 
We notice that the effectiveness of the aid improves in this case; in fact the coefficient of the 
interaction (0.08) is greater than the two coefficients of the aid in the first equation (0.04) and 
in the second equation (0.03). This conclusion is consistent with that of an earlier study by 
Collier and Dollar (2002). These authors have estimated a relationship between aid, politics 
and growth. They find that aid is subject to diminishing returns, but this absorption capacity 
depends on the level of policy and institutions as measured by the World Bank's annual rating, 
the assessment of national policies and institutions (Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment, CPIA). 
In another work studying aid effectiveness, Burnside and Dollar (2000) used a foreign aid 
database to examine the relationship between foreign aid, economic policies, and per capita 
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GDP growth.  According to these authors, the policies that have a significant effect on growth 
are the budget surplus, inflation and trade openness. They showed that aid has a positive 
impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. On 
the other hand, in the presence of bad policies, aid has no positive effect on growth. However, 
the coefficient of the composite index with foreign aid is positive but not significant in 
middle-income Africa. 
Table 12 presents the results of the OLS and GLS regressions of equation (3) for all our 
samples where the economic growth rate is taken as the dependent variable. It can be seen that 
the direct effect of international aid on economic growth is positive and highly significant (at 
the 1% threshold for the GLS), both for the full sample and low-income countries. The direct 
effect of the governance quality is positive and not significant in explaining economic growth. 
However, the coefficient associated with the interaction term between the level of governance 
and the amount of aid is positive and significant suggesting that the effect of the latter on 
economic growth depends on the governance quality.  
In order to test whether the effects of international aid, the governance quality and their 
interactions differ between low and middle income countries, we estimated the model 
separately for each sub group using firstly composite governance index and ultimately we 
dissociated the effect of each indicator. In both the OLS and GLS estimates, the applied 
Fisher test indicates that all models are globally significant. The Haussmann test shows that 
the fixed-effect model is preferable to the random-effect model for the full sample but random 
effect is more appropriate for low income countries (Table 12). By rejecting the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity, the Breush-Pagan test reveals the existence of heteroscedasticity in the 
estimated model. Wooldridge's test suggests the acceptance of hypothesis H0, which proves 
the presence of an autocorrelation problem at the level of errors8. 
The coefficient of the aid for development variable is positive and significant, which means 
that an increase in the amount of international aid stimulate economic growth rate in low-
income African countries but this effect is not significant for middle income economies. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable between aid for development and the composite index of 
governance is positive and statistically significant. This means that the positive effect of the 
international program for development assistance in African countries is completed in the 
presence of a high quality of governance. Conversely, positive effect of high level of foreign 
                                                             
8 Note that the same approach is followed for the other tables 13-18.  
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assistance on economic growth is lowered for countries characterized by bad governance 
quality. 
Indeed, this result emphasizes the negative effect or ineffectiveness of international aid in 
countries badly ruled. Otherwise, in the case of bad governance quality international resources 
are not legally and effectively allocated to productive sectors. In this context, poor governance 
gives agents less opportunities for investment and corruption will be reinforced by legal 
weaknesses, bureaucratic and political and administrative irresponsibility searching rents 
regardless of social purposes. This behavior may discourage economic growth since in this 
environment resources are divided between the different interest groups in proportion to their 
electoral pressures and do not reach the agents targeted by these aids. 
In summary, the results of the positive sign of the coefficient of aid and the positive sign of 
the interaction term can be interpreted as follows. Taken alone, the positive coefficient of the 
international help variable indicates that growth increases as countries receive more foreign 
resources. However, the positive coefficient of the interaction term between governance and 
the official development aid suggests that the positive effect of this variable depends on the 
level of countries’ institutional quality. More specifically, the expansive effect of received 
resources will be weakened at lower levels of governance and it may be more beneficial when 
guaranteeing a minimum degree of development of the regulatory and institutional 
framework. 
The coefficients of aid interactions with the composite index of governance indicators are 
significantly and positively correlated with economic growth. It is true that the effectiveness 
of aid in terms of economic growth is improving in the presence of governance in the 
countries of Africa as a whole and the countries of Africa with low incomes. For the case of 
African countries, the important role of governance in improving aid effectiveness is justified 
by the significance of the coefficients of the interactions between aid and the following 
indicators: the control of corruption (0, 062), government effectiveness (0.052), political 
stability (0.031),regulatory quality (0.090), rule of law (0.046) and voice and responsibility 
(0.076). However, this improvement in efficiency is explained, mainly, in low-income 
African countries, by the integration of aid interaction variables with the following indicators: 
regulatory quality (0.108); rule of law (0.422) and voice and responsibility (0.076). 
Nevertheless, governance plays no role in improving aid effectiveness in Africa's middle-
income economies. Indeed, the coefficient of the interaction of the aggregate index of 
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governance with international aid is positive but not significant. However, some governance 
indicators can improve the effectiveness of development assistance in this sub-region. In this 
context, we find that the "regulatory quality" indicator is positively (.048) and significantly 
correlated with economic growth at the 10% level. So, in this sub-region, only the quality of 
regulation can improve the effectiveness of development aid. 
When we have introduced the interaction variable, the coefficients of the variables of control 
have the same sign as in the results of the estimation of the direct effect of   international aid 
on economic growth (without interaction variable).Therefore, we can conclude that the 
governance is an indirect complementary factor in determining the effectiveness of 
international help to stimulate economic growth.  
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Table 12:  Indirect effect of governance quality on the aid-economic growth link   
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS RE GLS 
Oda 
 
-.0995 
(.050)** 
.3079 
(.039)*** 
.0901 
(.026)*** 
-.1097   
.051** 
.1908  
(.043) *** 
.0354 
(.022) 
.4756 
(.129) *** 
.7491 
(.106)*** 
.1919 
(.053)*** 
Gov 
 
.1119 
 (.243) 
-.4436 
(.181)** 
.1026 
(.125) 
-.10978 
   .051 
-.0784  
(.229) 
.1927 
(.126) 
-1.037 
(.560)* 
-2.046 
(.431)*** 
-.1669  
(.230) 
Oda*gov 
 
.0810 
(.062) 
.1786 
(.041)*** 
.0808 
(.029)*** 
-.0304 
 .066 
.0980 
(.048)** 
.0266 
(.025) 
.3407  
(.149) ** 
.5168  
(.114) *** 
.1064  
(.058)* 
 Inf 
 
-.00005 
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000)** 
.00013 
(.000)*** 
-.0002 
(.000) 
-.0002  
(.000) *** 
.0266 
.025 
.0001  
(.000) 
.0001  
(.000) 
.0003  
(.000) *** 
 m2 
 
.4679 
(.068)*** 
.5671 
(.060)*** 
.0867 
(.038)** 
.4118   
.102*** 
.9524 
(.097)*** 
.0101 
  (.070) 
.1016  
(.061) *** 
.1941 
(.067) *** 
.0029  
(.040) 
Pop 
 
-.2976 
(.043)*** 
.0009 
(.030) 
-.0916 
(.024)*** 
-.1861   
.077** 
.0079  
(.065) 
-.1475   
(.052) *** 
-.0890  
(.033) ** 
.0073  
(.027) 
.0085  
(.018) 
Ouv 
 
.7721 
(.099)*** 
-.2548 
(.119)** 
-.0364 
(.068) 
.3047 
.130** 
-.4185 
(.176)** 
-.1716   
(.096)* 
.2580 
(.114)** 
.3174  
(.139) ** 
-.0712  
(.074) 
Constant 
 
5.911 
(.374)*** 
3.993 
(.242)*** 
6.480 
(.191)*** 
6.646  
.564*** 
3.860 
(.462)*** 
7.839  
(.319) *** 
4.049  
(.507) *** 
2.169  
(.399) *** 
5.389   
(.252) *** 
Observations 672 672 672 355 355 355 317 317 317 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4680 0.1873  0.283 0.1636  0.199 0.1370  
R-squaredwithin  0.2842   0.3892   0.3528  
R-squared between  0.1591   0.1108   0.0237  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000   0.000   
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.000   0.9850   0.0000   
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)    0.000      
Wald test 0.000      0.0000   
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13:  Effect of control corruption on the aid-economic growth link  
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS 
Oda 
 
-.0747 
(.048) 
.2958 
(.037)*** 
.0926 (. 
027)** 
-.0775   
(.049) 
.2016 
(.042)*** 
.0444 
(.022)** 
.2770 
(.134)** 
.4288 
(.109)*** 
.1538 
(.058)*** 
Cc 
 
-.0160 
( .217) 
-.5864 
(.151)*** 
-.0753 
(.113) 
.1709 
(.223) 
-.3045 
(.189) 
.0102 
(.098) 
-.2498 
(.571) 
-.7326 
(.439)* 
-.0759 
(.228) 
Odacc 
 
.0679 
(.055) 
.1420  
(.036)*** 
.0621 
(.028) ** 
-.0025 
( .057) 
.1019 
 (.040)** 
.0268 
(.023) 
.0468 
(.153 
.1282 
(.117) 
.0342 
(.060) 
 Inf 
 
-.00007 
(.000) 
-.00014   
(.000) ** 
.0001 
(.000)** 
-.0002 
( .000)* 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00002 
(.000) 
.0004 
(.000)* 
.0004 
(.000)*** 
.0003 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
 
.5446 
(.067)*** 
.5533   
(.061) *** 
.1275 
(.041)*** 
.4634 
(.101)*** 
1.011 
(.102)*** 
.0240 
(.072) 
.2203 
(.060)*** 
.2567 
(.063)*** 
.0529 
(.043) 
Pop 
 
-.2922 
(.044)*** 
.0104 
(.030) 
-.1168 
( .027)*** 
-.1785 
( .079)** 
.0599 
(.069) 
-.1359 
(.052)** 
-.0721 
(.033)** 
-.0134 
(.027) 
.0041 
(.021) 
Ouv 
 
.7567 
(.101) *** 
-.2720   
(.120) ** 
-.0119 
(.072) 
.3045 
(.131) ** 
-.6228 
(.192)** 
-.1889 
(.095)** 
.1938 
(.117) 
.2358 
(.132) 
-.0345 
(.082) 
Constant 
5.485 
(.357)*** 
3.928  
(.224) *** 
6.257  
(.193) *** 
6.289 
(.549) 
3.585 
(.422)*** 
7.676 
(.318) *** 
4.210 
(.510)*** 
3.178 
(.410)*** 
5.257 
(.255)*** 
Observations 672 672 672 354 354 354 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.454 0.123   0.123  0.1702 0.1506  
R-squaredwithin  0.279   0.386   0.3290  
R-squared between  0.093   0.067   0.0441  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000   
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.000   0.001   0.8995   
Breusch pagan (p> chi2)       0.0000   
Wald test  0.000  0.000      
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 14. Effect of government effectiveness on foreign aid - economic growth relationship 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
Oda 
-.0535  
(.053) 
.3235 
(.040) *** 
.0841 
(.029) *** 
-.0293 
(.054) 
.2103 
(.044)*** 
.0529 
(.024) 
** 
.5059   
.148)*** 
.8815 
(.125)*** 
.1611 
(.069)** 
Eg 
.1156 
(.224) 
-.8019 
(.151) *** 
.0179 
 (.112) 
-.0888 
(.252) 
-.6328 
(.204)*** 
-.0389 
(.115) -.8319(.463)* 
-1.954 
(.356)*** 
-.0394 
(.207) 
Oda*eg 
.0737 
( .058) 
.1480 
(.037) *** 
.0529 
(.027)* 
.0544 
(.067) 
.1211 
(.045)*** 
.0413 
(.025) 
.2378 
(.121)* 
.4439 
(.096)*** 
.0354 
(.054) 
 Inf 
-.00009 
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000) ** 
.0001 
(.000)** 
-.0002 
(.000)* 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00001 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000)* 
.0003 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.4397 
(.069) *** 
.5717 
(.060) *** 
.0944 
(.040)** 
.4719 
(.105)*** 
.9892 
(.096)*** 
.0506 
(.072) 
.1719 
( .060) *** 
.2265 
(.063)*** 
.0304 
(.042) 
Pop 
-.2818 
(.043)*** 
.0143 
(.029) 
-.0924 
(.026)*** 
-.1931 
(.079)** 
.0494 
(.066) 
-.1508 
(.053) 
-.0868 
(.033) ** 
-.0038 
(.026) 
.0053 
(.020) 
Ouv 
.7938 
(.099)*** 
-.2621 
(.118)** 
-.0291 
(.070) 
.3231 
(.131)** 
-.5300 
(.176)*** 
-.1561 
(.097) 
.2431 
(.118) ** 
.2375 
(.134)* 
-.0511 
(.080) 
Constant 
5.835 
(.373)*** 
3.617 
(.241) *** 
6.412 
(.196)*** 
6.069 
(.563)*** 
3.480 
(.451)*** 
7.548 
 (.328 
3.627 
(.575) *** 
1.466 
(.461)*** 
5.356 
(.291)*** 
Observations 672 672 672 354 354 354 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.473 0.045  0.2719 0.1079  0.1800 0.1195  
R-squaredwithin  0.294   0.3904   0.3863  
R-squared between  0.017   0.0528   0.0074  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000   0.000 0.000  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.012   0.0000   0.0017   
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)    0.000      
Wald test 0.000         
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.0000   0.0000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 15: Effect of political stability on foreign aid - economic growth relationship 
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS OLS FE GLS 
Oda 
-.1588 
(.040)*** 
.2314 
(.032)*** 
.0611 
(.020)*** 
-.1896 
(.041)*** 
.1381 
(.037)*** 
.0238 
( .019) 
.2840 
(.070)*** 
.4332 
(.064) *** 
.1346 
( .031)*** 
sp 
.2314 
(.138)* 
-.0436 
(.092) 
-.0126 
(.059) 
.7016 
(.144)*** 
.2421 
(.114)** 
.1322 
( .065)** 
-.2836 
(.234) 
-.5510 
(.182) *** 
-.0753 
(.088) 
Oda*sp 
.0094 
(.036) 
.0526 
(.024)** 
.0311 
(.014)** 
-.1027 
(.038)*** 
-.0074 
(.029) 
.0039 
(.015) 
.1164 
(.062)* 
.1514 
(.047) *** 
.0344 
(.023) 
 Inf 
.00004 
(.000 
-.0001 
(.000) 
.0001 
(.000)** 
-.0001 
(.000) 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00001 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.0003 
(.000) ** 
.0003 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.5020 
(.063)*** 
.5632 
(.060)*** 
.0779 
(.039)** 
.3962 
(.091)*** 
.8971 
(.096)*** 
.0662 
(.070) 
.0873 
(.059) 
.2289 
(.068) *** 
-.0015 
(.041) 
Pop 
-.3181 
(.042)*** 
-.0106 
(.030) 
-.0822 
(.025)*** 
-.1970 
(.072)*** 
-.0609 
(.067) 
-.1665 
(.053) *** 
-.0793 
(.032) ** 
.0124 
(.0283) 
.0131 
(.019) 
Ouv 
.6774 
(.100)*** 
-.2551 
(.120)** 
-.0175 
(.068) 
.0768 
(.127) 
-.4196 
(.171)** 
-.1646 
(.096)* 
.2537 
(.112) ** 
.3124 
(.142)** 
-.0541 
(.077) 
Constant 
6.068 
(.336)*** 
4.292 
(.214)*** 
6.421 
(.175)*** 
7.265 
(.511)*** 
4.376 
(.442)*** 
7.668 
(.313) 
4.738 
(.327) *** 
3.332 
(.261) *** 
5.476 
(.190) *** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4782 0.1974  0.3597 0.2148  0.2257 0.165  
R-squaredwithin  0.2828   0.3941     0.3279  
R-squared between  0.1745   0.1694     0.060  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000   0.000 0.000  
Hausman ( p> chi2)  0.000   0.7245   0.000  
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)     0.000     
Wald test  0.000      0.000  
Wooldridge (p>chi2)  0.000   0.000   0.000  
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Table 16: Effect of regulatory quality on foreign aid - economic growth relationship 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS FE GLS OLS FE GLS 
Oda 
 
-.0026 
(.053) 
.3159 
(.038)*** 
.1134 
(.028)*** 
.0104 
(.056) 
.2113 
(.043)*** 
.0590 
(.025)** 
.4954 
(.116)*** 
.6418 
 (.095)*** 
.2181 
 (.052)*** 
Qr 
 
-.1664 
(.226) 
-.5115 
(.147)*** 
-.2226 
(.117)* 
-.2953 
(.253) 
-.2452 
(.196) 
-.1890 
(.125) 
-.8324 
(.405)** 
-1.313 
 (.320)*** 
-.3085 
(.190) 
Oda*qr 
 
.1652 
(.060)*** 
.1709 
(.036)*** 
.0907 
(.029)*** 
.1432 
(.068)** 
.1194 
(.043)*** 
.0486 
(.028)* 
.2798 
(.108)** 
.3585 
 (.087)*** 
.1089 
 (.050)** 
 Inf 
 
-.00005 
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000)** 
.0001 
(.000)** 
-.0002 
(.000) 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00002 
(.000) 
.0001 
(.000) 
.0002 
(.000) 
.00031 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
 
.4615 
(.064)*** 
.5789 
(.060)*** 
.1595 
(.041)*** 
.4373 
(.100)*** 
1.041 
(.101)*** 
.0747 
(.072) 
.1171 
( .058)** 
.2187 
( .067)*** 
.0552 
(.042) 
Pop 
 
-.2920 
(.042)*** 
.0040 
(.029) 
-.1119 
(.027)*** 
-.1833 
 (.077)** 
.0250 
(.066) 
-.1616 
(.054)*** 
-.0962 
( .033)*** 
.0069 
( .027) 
0053 
(.020) 
Ouv 
 
.8138 
(.097)*** 
-.2404 
(.119)** 
.0089 
(.071) 
.3397 
(.130)*** 
-.6277 
(.189)*** 
-.1686 
(.096)* 
.3399 
( .116)*** 
.3530   
( .143)** 
-.0260 
( .079) 
Constant 
 
5.577 
(.356)*** 
3.874 
(.232)*** 
6.017 
(.199)*** 
6.048 
(.546)*** 
3.572 
(.424)*** 
7.424 
(.327)*** 
3.9172   
( .447)*** 
2.595 
( .358)*** 
5.024 
( .244)*** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4873 0.1933                                       0.2878 0.1454  0.217 0.1731  
R-squaredwithin  0.2865   0.3895   0.342  
R-squared between  0.1680   0.0925   0.069  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
Hausman ( p> chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.016   
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)          
Wald test 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 17: Effect of the rule and law on foreign aid - economic growth relationship 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS 
Oda 
-.0917 
(.050)* 
.2821 
(.039)*** 
.0861 
(.028) *** 
-.1040 
(.051)** 
.1732 
(.045)*** 
.0331 
(.023) 
.6738 
(.127) *** 
.7962 
 (.105) *** 
.2307 
(.059) *** 
ed 
.1415 
(.203) 
-.1991 
(.142) 
.0725 
(.102) 
.3287 
(.220) 
-.0501 
(.192) 
.0899 
(.105) 
-1.448 
(.419) *** 
-1.669 
(.330) *** 
.2307 
(.059) 
Oda*ed 
.0472 
(.051) 
.1126 
(.034)*** 
.0466 
(.024)* 
-.0360 
(.055) 
.0440 
(.040) 
.0081 
(.021) 
.4220 
(.111) *** 
.4682 
(.087) *** 
.1043 
(.049) ** 
 Inf 
-.00005    
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000)* 
.0001 
(.000)*** 
-.0002 
(.000) 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00002 
(.000) 
.00005 
(.000) 
.0001 
(.000) 
.0003 
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.4626 
(.070) *** 
.5581 
(.060)*** 
.1047 
(.040)*** 
.4083 
(.106)*** 
1.005 
(.104)*** 
.0226 
(.072) 
.1149 
(.059)* 
.1832 
(.062) *** 
.0230 
( .042) 
Pop 
-.2988 
(.043) *** 
.0040 
(.030) 
-.0974 
(.026)*** 
-.1828 
(.078)** 
.0161 
(.068) 
-.1348 
(.053)** 
-.0900 
(.033)* 
-.0031 
(.026) 
.0070 
( .019) 
Ouv 
.7611 
(.099) *** 
-.2935 
(.120)** 
-.0248 
(.071) 
.3076 
(.130)** 
-.6447 
(.191)*** 
-.1612 
(.097)* 
.2125 
(.112)* 
.2615 
(.130)** 
-.0717 
(.077) 
Constant 
5.907 
(.380) *** 
4.178 
(.239)*** 
6.396 
(.197)*** 
6.618 
(.577)*** 
3.849 
(.454)*** 
7.720 
(.328)*** 
3.248   
(.495) *** 
2.244 
(.390) *** 
5.176 
(.257)*** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4649 0.1869  0.2786 0.1331  0.21 0.196  
R-squaredwithin  0.2792   0.3739   0.366  
R-squared between  0.1585   0.0813   0.094  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000   
Hausman ( p> chi2)  0.000  0.000   0.312   
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)       0.000   
Wald test  0.000  0.000      
Wooldridge (p>chi2)  0.000  0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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18: Effect of voice and accountability on foreign aid - economic growth relationship 
 
Full sample Middle-income African countries Low-income African countries 
Variables OLS FE GLS OLS FE GLS OLS RE GLS 
Oda 
-.0917 
(.046)** 
.3134 
(.037)*** 
.1002   
.025)*** 
-.0550 
(.047) 
.2359 
(.042)*** 
.0393 
(.023)* 
.1686 
(.098)* 
.5137 
 (.079)*** 
.1803  
(.044)*** 
vr 
-.0446 
(.172) 
-.4823 
(.126)*** 
-.1341 
(.095) 
.0585 
(.177) 
-.2729 
(.150)* 
.0463 
 (.094) 
.2302 
 (.385) 
-.9846 
 (.291) *** 
-.1943  
(.159) 
Oda*vr 
.0464 
(.044) 
.1645 
(.031) *** 
.0760 
(.022) *** 
-.0202 
(.046) 
.1565 
(.036)*** 
.0257 
(.021) 
-.0324 
(.101) 
.2542  
(.076) *** 
.0760 
(.042)* 
 Inf 
-.00007 
(.000) 
-.0001 
(.000) ** 
.0001 
(.000) *** 
-.0002 
(.000)* 
-.0002 
(.000)*** 
.00003 
( .000) 
.0004 
(.000)** 
.0003 (.000) 
** 
.0003  
(.000)*** 
 m2 
.5705 
(.067)*** 
.5777 
(.060) *** 
.1285 
(.041) ** 
.5235 
(.101)*** 
1.074 
(.100)*** 
.0381 
(.071) 
.1719  
(.059)*** 
..2446 
(.062)*** 
.0173 
 (.042) 
Pop 
-.3227 
(.043)*** 
-.0078 
(.029) 
-.1228     
.027)*** 
-.2245 
(.077)*** 
.0247 
(.065) 
-.1631 
(.052)*** 
-.0861 
( .033)** 
.0015 
( .027) 
.0045 
 (.020) 
Ouv 
.8007 
(.101)*** 
-.2994   
.118)** 
.018491   
.072) 
.3096 
(.131)** 
-.5963 
(.185)*** 
-.1893   
(.096)* 
.2454 
( .119)** 
.2167 
(.132) 
-.0487 
(.079) 
Constant 
5.434 
(.362)*** 
3.933  
.239)*** 
6.189   
.198)*** 
6.010    
.566*** 
3.362 
(.435)*** 
7.709 
( .326)*** 
4.917 
( .416)*** 
3.014 
(.340)*** 
5.295 
(.224)*** 
Observations 673 673 673 355 355 355 318 318 318 
Number of groups 48 48 48 25 25 25 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.4494 0.1498  0.2681 0.1157  0.17 0.138  
R-squaredwithin  0.2934   0.4111   0.334  
R-squared between  0.1231   0.0669   0.028  
Fischer (prob> F) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000   
Hausman (p> chi2) 0.000   0.0370   0.996   
Breuschpagan (p> chi2)       0.000   
Wald test 0.000   0.000      
Wooldridge (p>chi2) 0.000   0.000   0.000   
Values in parentheses correspond are p-values; ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5. Conclusion and policy implications  
At the end of our current research, it appears that the effectiveness of development aid 
increases with the presence of the good quality of economic policies, in particular better 
quality of governance measured by different indicators of the governance extracted from the 
World Bank (CC, RL, GE, PS, VA and RQ), as well as the weighted composite index. In fact, 
we first studied the aid-growth relationship for the case of African countries. We subdivided 
our sample into two sub-regions: low-income countries and middle-income countries. The 
static9 model results show that Development Aid has a positive effect on economic growth in 
all African countries (low-income and middle-income countries). Nevertheless, this effect is 
more important in the case of low-income countries. Thus, foreign aid is seen as an engine of 
economic growth for the development of African economies regardless of income level. 
In a second place, we examined the effect of international aid on economic growth, in the 
presence of governance. In this framework, we have integrated the indicators of good 
governance developed by Kaufmann Kraay and Mastruzy (2010) (Voice and 
Accountability(VA), Government Effectiveness (GE), Political Stability (PS), Quality of 
regulation (RQ), the control of corruption (CC), rule of law (RL) and their composite index in 
order to avoid any correlation effect that may exist between these indicators. The results show 
that the effectiveness of the international assistance is improving with the integration of 
governance only in the case of low-income countries, while the inclusion of this variable in 
our model, in the case of middle-income African countries, has no effect. Governance has a 
positive effect on economic growth in African economies (sample global) but it weakens the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of economic growth in that the aid coefficient has 
decreased from equation (1) to equation (2). 
Lastly, we introduced the interaction between aid and governance (aid*GOV) similarly as 
done previously in order to study the conditionality of aid effectiveness. Indeed, interactions 
between the Development Aid variable and the composite indicator of governance is firstly 
checked. Then, the interactions between each indicator of the governance and the amount of 
International Aid in relation to economic growth are taken into account. Thus, these 
coefficients are insignificant in African middle-income economies. So, the assumption that 
                                                             
9 We did not pass to the dynamic panel estimation techniques because when conducting an endogeineity test of Wooldridge-
Wu we reject the assumption of presence of endogeineity for the dependent variable. This means that our data does not suffer 
from endogeineity or simultaneity problems and that our results are robust and unbiased. 
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aid effectiveness is conditioned by the presence of good institutional policies without 
precision is questioned in these economies. Nevertheless, in this sub-region, only the quality 
of regulation (RQ) as a desegregated measure of governance quality improves the 
effectiveness of development assistance. In other words, Middle-income African countries 
need improving regulatory framework in order to guarantee economic growth when receiving 
aid from international donors.  
 However, for the other two subsamples (global and low-income African countries), this 
assumption is confirmed in the sense that the effectiveness of foreign aid may be significantly 
improved in countries with good institutional policies. Indeed, the improvement of aid 
effectiveness in terms of economic growth is explained, mainly, in low-income African 
countries, by the integration of the following sub-indices: Regulatory quality, the rule of law 
and voice and responsibility. On the other hand, improving the effectiveness of aid, in the 
case of Africa as a whole, is justified, in large part, by the control of corruption, the quality of 
regulation, and the voice and responsibility. 
In summary, we think that our work contributes to the previous literature on development aids 
by permitting an institutional approach that address the link between the amount of aid and 
the level of growth. This paper has the merit of identifying the most important institutional 
factor responsible for the absence or lack of a remarkable positive effect of foreign flows in 
African countries. Our empirical results imply that sound economic policies are primordial for 
the effectiveness of Development aid in terms of economic growth. So, it is essential for 
policy makers to take into account the objective of improving the quality of governance and 
particularly to strengthen the regulatory framework in order to better benefit from foreign 
development supports by allocating these resources to the most productive projects. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Factors analysis’s for 48 African countries  
African low- income countries 
Table A.1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean StdDeviation Analysed N 
CC -,7845 ,39810 345 
GE -,9526 ,45359 345 
PS -,7693 ,83621 345 
RQ -,8326 ,51031 345 
RL -,9087 ,50552 345 
VA -,7511 ,54393 345 
Table A.1.2: Correlation matrix 
 CC GE PS RQ RL VA 
Correlation 
CC 1,000 ,712 ,572 ,673 ,737 ,496 
GE ,712 1,000 ,546 ,775 ,802 ,489 
PS ,572 ,546 1,000 ,591 ,729 ,703 
RQ ,673 ,775 ,591 1,000 ,831 ,579 
RL ,737 ,802 ,729 ,831 1,000 ,658 
VA ,496 ,489 ,703 ,579 ,658 1,000 
Table A.1.3 : Representation qualities(Communalitios) 
 Initial Extraction 
CC 1,000 ,750 
GE 1,000 ,861 
PS 1,000 ,832 
RQ 1,000 ,815 
RL 1,000 ,889 
VA 1,000 ,868 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Table A.1.4 : Total variance explained 
Composant Initial Eigenvalues10 Extraction sums of Squared loadings 
Total % of 
variance 
Cumulation 
% 
Total % of 
variance 
Cumulation 
% 
1 4,315 71,918 71,918 4,315 71,918 71,918 
2 ,701 11,683 83,601 ,701 11,683 83,601 
3 ,356 5,926 89,528    
4 ,288 4,801 94,329    
5 ,211 3,513 97,842    
6 ,129 2,158 100,000    
Table A.1.5 : Component Matrixa  
 Components 
1 2 
CC ,826 -,262 
GE ,857 -,356 
PS ,810 ,420 
RQ ,881 -,197 
RL ,941 -,057 
VA ,762 ,536 
Extraction Method: component Analysis Method. a. 2 components extracted 
TableA.1.6: KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. ,899 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
Approx Chi-Square 2678,328 
Ddl 15 
Sig ,000 
African Middle income countries   
Table A.1.7: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std Deviation Analysed N 
CC -,4179 ,63079 374 
GE -,4423 ,60076 374 
PS -,3427 ,90844 374 
RQ -,4424 ,59101 374 
RL -,4668 ,65846 374 
VA -,4987 ,77933 374 
 
 
                                                             
10
The eigenvalue for a given factor measures the variance in all the variables which is accounted for by that factor. The ratio of eigenvalues 
is the ratio of explanatory importance of the factors with respect to the variables. Eigenvalues measure the amount of variation in the total 
sample accounted for by each factor. 
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Table A.1.8: Correlation matrix 
 CC GE PS RQ RL VA 
Correlation 
CC 1,000 ,890 ,716 ,809 ,901 ,771 
GE ,890 1,000 ,647 ,893 ,905 ,757 
PS ,716 ,647 1,000 ,606 ,768 ,641 
RQ ,809 ,893 ,606 1,000 ,842 ,756 
RL ,901 ,905 ,768 ,842 1,000 ,783 
VA ,771 ,757 ,641 ,756 ,783 1,000 
Table A.1.9 : Representation qualities(Communalitios) 
 Initial Extraction 
CC 1,000 ,885 
GE 1,000 ,930 
PS 1,000 ,982 
RQ 1,000 ,896 
RL 1,000 ,924 
VA 1,000 ,754 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Table A.1.10 : Total variance explained  
Composant Initial Eigenvalues Extraction sums of Squared loadings 
Total % of 
variance 
Cumulation 
% 
Total % of 
variance 
Cumulation 
% 
1 4,913 81,882 81,882 4,913 81,882 81,882 
2 ,458 7,628 89,510 ,458 7,628 89,510 
3 ,295 4,915 94,425    
4 ,176 2,930 97,355    
5 ,090 1,501 98,856    
6 ,069 1,144 100,000    
Table A.1.11 : Component Matrixa 
 
 Components 
1 2 
RL ,961 ,029 
GE ,943 -,199 
CC ,941 -,023 
RQ ,908 -,268 
VA ,867 -,050 
PS ,799 ,585 
Extraction Method: component Analysis Method. a. 2 components extracted 
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Table A.1.12: KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. ,899 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
Approx Chi-Square 2678,328 
Ddl 15 
Sig ,000 
Appendix 2: Data descriptions  
Table A.2.1:  Correlation matrix between governance indicators 
  
CC VR QR SP ED EG 
Low-income african countries  
 
 
 
 
CC 1 
VA 0,4965 1    
RQ 0,6726 0,5787 1    
PS 0,5722 0,7032 0,5914 1    
RL 0,7367 0,6585 0,8315 0,7293 1    
GE 0,7116 0,4886 0,7747 0,5459 0,8016 1    
Middle income african countries  
 
 
 
CC 1 
RL 0,9015 1 
GE 0,8896 0,9045 1 
VA 0,7701 0,7815 0,7549 1 
RQ 0,8087 0,8405 0,8925 0,7544 1 
PS 0,7146 0,7672 0,6453 0,6395 0,6035 1 
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Table A.2.2:  Variable definition and sources 
Variables Definitions Sources  
Y Gross domestic product per capita 
(current US$) 
World 
Bank 
Apd Net ODA received per capita (current 
US$) 
World 
Bank 
Inf Inflation is measured on the basis of 
the GDP deflator 
World 
Bank 
Pop It refers to the total population of the 
country in million 
World 
Bank 
M2 It corresponds to the money supply in 
terms of m2 relative to GDP and 
measures the level of internal 
financial liberalization. It also makes 
it possible to evaluate the efficiency 
of financial intermediation. 
World 
Bank 
Ouv It measures commercial openness and 
is measured by the sum of import and 
export to total GDP 
World 
Bank 
Governance composite index (GOV): 
it corresponds to the weighted 
average of the six sub-indicators of 
governance quality where 
coefficients are indicated in 
subsection 3.2.1and varies between -
2.5 and 2.5.   
CC Control of corruption : it ranges 
between -2.5 and 2.5 
World 
Bank 
(WGI) VA Voice and accountability: it varies 
between -2.5 and 2.5 
PS Political stability : it is between -2.5 
and 2.5 
RL Rule of Law: it switches between -2.5 
and 2.5 
RQ Regulatory Quality: it is included in 
the -2.5 and 2.5 bounds 
GE Government effectiveness : it belongs 
to the interval(-2.5; 2.5) 
Appendix 3:  Sample choice and Official Development Aid repartition    
Table A.3.1: List of Countries  
Middle income  Low income 
Algeria Mauritania Benin  Niger 
Angola Mauritius Burkina Faso  Rwanda 
Botswana Namibia Burundi Sierra Leone 
Cameroun Nigeria Comoros Tanzania 
Cape Verde Sao Tome and Principe Ethiopia Tchad 
Côte d'Ivoire South Africa Gambia Togo 
Egypt Senegal Guinea Uganda 
Gabon Swaziland Guinea-Bissau Zimbabwe 
Ghana Tunisie Tunisia Liberia  
Kenya Zambia Madagascar  
Lesotho  Malawi  
Libya  Mali  
Morocco  Mozambique  
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Table A. 3. 2: Distribution of International Official Development by region 
 In billions of dollars 
Latin America and the Caribbean 10  
Europe and Central Asia 10  
East Asia 9  
Middle East and North Africa 5  
South Asia 11  
Sub-Saharan Africa 15  
Source: Annual Report of the World Bank (2015) 
